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Recent years have witnessed several proposals to reconsider American consti-
tutionalism in light of the "civic republican" strain identified by historians in
the political thought of the founding era. This new republicanism must meet
(among others) two objections. First, that traditional republicanism was a sol-
idaristic doctrine presupposing a degree of moral consensus that is nonexis-
tent in a modern, diverse, liberal society. Second, that it was a majoritarian
doctrine of popular legislative supremacy that is fundamentally incompatible
with the modern constitutionalist aim of securing, by judicially enforced
higher law, individual rights against political oppression. Professor
Michelman takes up these two objections to the "republican revival," contend-
ing that only through a modern reconsideration of republican constitutional
thought can we hope to make sense for our age of Americans' persistent beliefs
and avowals that political liberty calls for both "a government of the people,
by the people" and "a government of laws and not of men." Drawing support
from both traditional republican sources and contemporary readings, the au-
thor argues that these two demands are jointly satisfiable only by ideally con-
ceiving of both legislative politics and constitutional adjudication as forms of
t Professor of Law, Harvard University. Many friends provided help with earlier drafts. Special
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self-revisionary normative dialogue through which personal moral freedom is
also achieved. Using Bowers v. Hardwick as an example, he suggests that
such a dialogic-republican constitutional theory can inspire stronger judicial
protection of individual rights than do competing theories.
I. INTRODUCTION: REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Bowers v. Hardwick: Authority vs. Freedom
I begin with three premises: First, the Supreme Court's analysis and
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick' are strikingly resistant to obvious claims
of political freedom.2 Second, judicial constitutional analysis ought to be
receptive to such claims. Third, constitutional analysis is rooted in under-
lying, often tacit, sensibilities and understandings regarding the larger
aims and methods of constitutionalism. Prompted by Hardwick's case, I
will consider how contemporary American constitutional understanding
and analysis might benefit from serious and sympathetic (but not uncriti-
cal) reflection upon the civic-republican strain in political thought that
has been identified, traced, and analyzed in much recent writing on his-
tory,3 social and political theory,4 and American constitutionalism.5 My
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia law criminalizing homosexual sodomy, as applied to
adult defendant's conduct in his own home with consenting adult partner).
2. See, e.g., Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv.
800, 852-57 (1986); Note, The Supreme Court: Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 210, 215-18
(1986). By "political freedom" I mean the redemption or achievement of personal freedom from or
through the institutionalized social power that regulates social conflicts, given a perception of need for
some form of such power. To perceive such a need, as I do, is to open oneself to the experience of
"dilemma"-"either resign yourself to some established version of social order, or face the war of all
against all"-that, as Roberto Unger says, prompts many to believe that legal-doctrinal practice must
somehow be kept insulated from genuine "controversy over the basic terms of social life." This essay
concurs in Unger's rejection of that view: An order or practice may retain its identity while undergo-
ing transformation through a process of reflexive criticism. See R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT 15 (1986). Indeed, as Unger says, it is only such an expanded notion of the
identity and continuity of a doctrinal order that can sustain "the validity of normative and program-
matic argument itself; at least this must be true when such argument takes the standard form of
working from within a tradition rather than the exceptional one of appealing to transcendent insight."
Id. at 15-16.
3. See, e.g., J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF
THE 1790's (1984); B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); F. MACDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION (1985); D. McCoY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN
AMERICA (1980); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography,
39 WM. & MARY Q. 334 (1982).
4. See, e.g., B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE
(1984); R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 28-31 & passim (1985) [hereinafter R. BEL-
LAH]; R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS AND
PRAXIS (1983); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); C. TAYLOR, Kant's Theory of Freedom, in 2
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 318 (1985); Cornell, Toward a
ModernlPostmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1986); Herzog, Some Ques-
tions for Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986); Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the
Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984).
5. See, e.g., D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984); G. STONE, L.
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task is to explain how an examination of our constitutionalism from a
republican-inspired standpoint might help invigorate a constitutional dis-
course that would steel judges against the desertion of claims like
Hardwick's.
To many readers this may seem a lunatic undertaking. Classical repub-
licanism, with its legacy of excluding from the political community all
those whose voices would-by reason of supposed defect of understanding,
foreignness of outlook, subservience of position, or corruption of inter-
est-threaten disruption of a community's normative unity, will seem
sadly consonant with the result in Bowers. "Republicanism" conjures up
just that strain in the history of political thought that would defend a
repressive and discriminatory law for which there is no justification save
"majority sentiments about . ..morality," for the simple reason that
"[t]he law ...is constantly based on notions of morality."6 Even worse,
republicanism suggests justification of such a law on the frightening
ground that its specific moral motivation "is firmly rooted in Judaeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards" 7-standards to which (it seems to
be implied) the entire political community is forever committed by the
community's history as read from a particular moral-majoritarian
perspective.
I will contend, to the contrary, that republican constitutional thought is
not indissolubly tied to any such static, parochial, or coercive communitar-
ianism; that, indeed, reconsideration of republicanism's deeper constitu-
tional implications can remind us of how the renovation of political com-
munities, by inclusion of those who have been excluded, enhances
everyone's political freedom. Republican constitutionalism, I will argue,
involves a kind of normative tinkering. It involves the ongoing revision of
the normative histories that make political communities sources of contest-
able value and self-direction for their members. This tinkering entails not
only the recognition but also the kind of re-cognition-reconception-of
those histories that will always be needed to extend political community to
persons in our midst who have as yet no stakes in "our" past because they
had no access to it.8
SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5-13 (1986); Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1013 (1984); Frug, The City As a Legal
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980); Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American
Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987); Michelman, The Supreme Court
1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sherry, Civic
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
6. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); see, e.g., Herzog, supra note 4, at 483-86.
7. 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see Richards, supra note 2, at 861; Simon, The
New Republicanism: Generosity of Spirit in Search of Something to Say, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv.
83, 91-92 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Hirsch, The Threnody of Liberalism: Constitutional Liberty and the Renewal of
Community, 14 POL. THEORY 423, 424-25 (1986) (warning contemporary communitarian political
thought against insensitivity to issues of belonging and exclusion).
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If republican thought does thus, as I believe, contain visionary resources
of use to modern liberal constitutionalism, we need not fear drawing upon
those resources because of their sometime historical connection with an
obnoxiously solidaristic social doctrine.' Contemporary American liberals
have less to fear from lurking social solidarism than from a constitutional
jurisprudence that debases the community by slighting its self-transforma-
tive capacity, and abets the community's self-betrayal through lapse of
commitment to extension of membership to persons who, at many histori-
cal moments, could not count themselves heirs to traditions whose mean-
ings did at those times involve the exclusion or subordination of just those
persons.10
What ought chiefly to alarm liberals about the Bowers decision, then, is
not a judicial affection for moral majoritarianism that the Justices collec-
tively almost certainly do not hold and could not propagate if they did.
Rather, it is the decision's embodiment of an excessively detached and
passive judicial stance toward constitutional law. The devastating effect in
Bowers of a judicial posture of deference to external authority appears in
the majority's assumption, plain if not quite explicit in its opinion, that
public values meriting enforcement as law are to be uncritically equated
with either the formally enacted preferences of a recent legislative or past
constitutional majority, or with the received teachings of an historically
dominant, supposedly civic, orthodoxy. I will call such a looking backward
jurisprudence authoritarian because it regards adjudicative actions as le-
gitimate only insofar as dictated by the prior normative utterance, express
or implied, of extra-judicial authority."1
9. But see Simon, supra note 7.
10. Consider Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1358-59 (1988) ("The most significant aspect of
Black oppression seems to be what is believed about Black Americans, not what Black Americans
believe.... Blacks seem to carry the stigma of 'otherness,' which effectively precludes their potentially
radicalizing influence from penetrating the dominant consciousness."); id. at 1385 ("Optimally, the
deconstruction of white race consciousness might lead to a liberated future for both Blacks and
whites."). For testimony to, and accounts of, the experience of exclusion, see, e.g., D. BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED 26-42 & passim (1987); Lopez, The Idea of a Constitution in the Chicano Tradi-
tion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1987); Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987). But cf Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay For Rob-
ert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1880 (1987) ("Some people may feel so shut out that the appeal to a
communal commitment to rights makes no sense to them. Nonetheless, an interpretive conception of
rights is a way to . . . promote change by reliance on inherited traditions."); Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructed Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 415
(1987):
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true; yet it is also true that blacks believed
in them so much and so hard that we gave them life where there was none before.... This
was the resurrection of life from 400-year-old ashes; the parthenogenesis of unfertilized hope.
See also infra text accompanying notes 117-23; id, 152-56.
11. "Originalists" such as Robert Bork are one camp within authoritarianism. See, e.g.,
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.) (only fresh expression of
"the moral choices of the people and their elected representatives" can justify court in "protect[ing]
from regulation a form of behavior [i.e., homosexual sex] never before protected, and indeed tradition-
ally condemned" when claimed right to protection has "little or no cognizable roots in the language or
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Justice White's opinion for the Court in Bowers wears its positivistic
constitutional theory on its sleeve: It is not for the Court to "impose" its
members' "own choice of values" on the people by "announc[ing] . . .a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy," contrary to both the
formally legislated will of the Georgia majority and (as the Court be-
lieved12) "'the Nation's history and tradition' " as manifested in state leg-
islation widely in force when both the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments
were ratified.1 3 If the Court declares the existence of fundamental consti-
tutional rights "having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution," says the Justice, it wrongly assumes power
"to govern the country without express constitutional authority."1
The deeper premises of the Bowers majority, although unstated, are
clear enough: Most fundamentally, the Court is the servant, not the au-
thor, of a prescriptive text. As such, it inquires into mean-
ing-signification-not into reason or value. Justice Blackmun's plea for
evaluating Hardwick's claim "in the light of the values that underlie the
constitutional right of privacy"" thus fails, in the majority's view, because
the values on which Blackmun would base protection of Hardwick's pri-
vacy against the declared will of the current legislative majority of Geor-
gia cannot be credibly traced to any historical occasion of popular higher
law-making. Even granting that the people speaking through the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments meant to insulate a traditional regard for
family privacy from the general norm of rule by contemporary majorities,
it is "facetious," says Justice White, to suggest that they meant that ex-
ception to cover the right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 6 The people's
duly registered constitutional and legislative choices to protect certain
privacies and not others is their own political matter with which the Su-
preme 'Court has nothing to do; the Court engaged in constitutional adju-
dication is an organ of law, and therefore not of politics.
even the design of the Constitution"); Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, in
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, THE FRANCIS BOYER LEC-
TURES ON PUBLIC POLICY 10 (1984) ("It is necessary to establish the propositions that the framers'
intentions with respect to freedoms are the sole legitimate premise from which constitutional analysis
may proceed."). Surprisingly, another authoritarian constitutional theorist is Bruce Ackerman. While
Ackerman's theory is best noted for its claim that We The People can amend the Constitution in ways
not recognized by Article V, see Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1055, 1057-73, that theory also insists
that today's constitutional interpretations must refer to the dictates of past episodes-"transformative"
moments-of popular law-making. See Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1164 (1988); see also Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1070-71. For a critical appreciation of Acker-
man's view, see infra text accompanying notes 103-23.
12. This belief was evidently based on oversimplified and misleadingly selective historical claims.
See Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants
of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988).
13. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.)).
14. Id. at 194-95.
15. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 194.
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Dare one ask: Why ought the Supreme Court not be an organ of polit-
ics, if that is what it takes to secure liberty and justice for Hardwick and
those for whom he stands? Because-so runs the answer clearly implied
by Justice White's opinion and the familiar constitutional dogma that in-
forms it-for the Court to act politically, as a law-maker and not just a
law-finder, would amount to a judicial usurpation of power that belongs
by right to others, to "the people" acting through their electorally ac-
countable representatives. But again, why? Why by right to others? Why
ought popular-majoritarian preference rather than judicial argument ulti-
mately determine the question of law controlling Hardwick's liberty?
While the Court's opinion does not directly speak to this question, we
already know the answer. It is, of course, democracy.1" But that answer
without more is both lazy and presumptuous. It conjures with a term that
rings of sovereign value, but too often does so without pausing to consider
what that value is."' Too often, indeed, the invocation of democracy in
defense of judicial restraint signifies little more than faute de mieux; too
17. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
2-4 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles]; Bork, supra note 11, at 9, 11 ("Constitutional
scholarship today is dominated by the creation of arguments that will encourage judges to thwart
democratic choice.... In a constitutional democracy, the moral content of law must be given by the
morality of the framer or legislator, never by the morality of the judge.").
Earl Maltz denies that the case for originalism need rest on any notion of democracy. According to
Maltz, "the originalist position is ... grounded [not] on democracy ... but on the concept of law"
and on a corresponding "view[] of the appropriate function of judges in a well-ordered society."
Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONSTrrUTIONAL COMMENTARY
43, 53, 56 (1987). With respect, I find Maltz's distinction puzzling. It is by now widely recognized
that concepts of law, views of judicial function, and related notions of social well-orderedness are all
embedded in some substantive political-moral conception, tacit or explicit, see, e.g., R. DWORKIN, The
Forum of Principle, in A MAErra OF PRINCIPLE 33, 34-57 (1985), and indeed Maltz himself ac-
knowledges this. See Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 774-75.
I understand that an originalist approach to constitutional adjudication might suggest itself to those
holding certain notions about legality and judicial role, but I cannot see how the connection between
legality and originalism could be persuasively drawn within the context of American constitutionalism
without at some point appealing to a normative notion of democracy or self-government by the people.
Maltz himself argues that "constitutional [like statutory] supremacy derives from the intuition that the
Constitution embodies the will of a [legitimate] governmental body whose authority is superior to
. * . courts . . . ." Id. at 789. It's true that Maltz also suggests that conventional belief in the legiti-
macy of these law-giving assemblies is independent of any concern about "whether [they are] demo-
cratically selected." Id. at 783. But if Maltz means by this that the conventional legitimacy of these
bodies has nothing to do with their being perceived as representative of the people and their will(s), he
has simply posited their legitimacy while repudiating the only explanation of it that the discourse of
constitutionalism has ever, to my knowledge, entertained. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles, supra,
at 3-4.
18. See Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 4, 21-22
(1987) (criticizing "aggressive constitutionalism" for "diminish[ing] the role of democracy" while haz-
arding no affirmative account of democracy's value); Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 17, at 2-3
(asserting that "it is a 'given' in our society" that "in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule
for no better reason than that they are majorities"); cf Lyons, Substance, Process, and Outcome in
Constitutional Theory 72 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 754 (1987):
Most constitutional scholars seem to believe . . . that a theory concerning the character of
constitutional institutions must guide an interpretation of the Constitution itself. But these
scholars usually limit their general theories to simple talk about "democracy" or "majoritari-
anism." They fail to explain what that means, in part because they do not address the question
of what values a constitutional system like ours should serve.
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often, it means merely that if a determination of law can only, at bottom,
be a matter of acceding to someone's preferences, then the people should
be ruled by the sum of their own preferences (as mediated by the system
of representation) rather than by the preferences of a few judges.' De-
mocracy thus conveniently answers to the need for authority: When the
social determination of disputed questions of value is imaginable only as a
battle of preferences or as the exertion of an arbitrary, dominant will,
then law-the adjudicative act-tends to be understandable only as the
unquestioning and uncreative (which is not to say necessarily wooden or
unintelligent) application of the prior word of some socially recognized,
extra-judicial authority.20
I believe that a close consideration of certain implications of historical
republican constitutional thought can point us toward an account of the
relations among law, politics, and democracy that not only would have
called for the opposite result in Bowers, but that Americans also will, on
reflection, recognize as truer in other respects to their most basic under-
standings of what constitutionalism is all about.2" This is the republican-
ism I advocate.
B. Constitutionalism: Self-Rule As Law-Rule
I take American constitutionalism-as manifest in academic constitu-
tional theory, in the professional practice of lawyers and judges, and in
the ordinary political self-understanding of Americans at large-to rest on
19. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 17, at 3.
20. Thus, when Judge Posner suggests that, in the popular understanding, our only choice lies
between having judges "decide cases in accordance with law, viewed as a body of principles external
to the policy preferences of the individual judges" and letting judges decide in accordance with their
own "views of public policy," Posner, supra note 18, at 33, many readers will rush to construe the
Judge's words as meaning that the only perceived alternative to illegitimate judicial self-indulgence is
judicial deference to objective, determinate and determining, positive-legal authority. On that construc-
tion of it (which does not, in fact, accord with the Judge's view, see Posner, The Jurisprudence of
Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827 (1988)), Judge Posner's analysis would allow no space for the
possibility of a judicial decision according to persuasive and disciplined argument in which the gov-
erning principles are themselves determined in the course of the argument. See, e.g., Farber &
Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1645-56 (1987);
Michelman, supra note 5, at 28-29.
Owen Fiss and Robin West both draw the connection between a conception of politics as the regis-
tration of preferences (as opposed to the determination of values) and a deferential/authoritarian
judicial attitude towards constitutional adjudication. See Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1, 15 (1979); West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 531, 535-37, 541-45 (1988).
21. In Reconsidering the Rule of Law (forthcoming 1989), Margaret Jane Radin approaches
from the opposite direction the possibility of a "modern reinterpretation" of "the rule of law" that is
strikingly convergent with the "republican" interpretation offered in this Article. Radin launches her
inquiry from a Wittgensteinian critique of the idea that verbal rules could possibly govern us, whereas
I launch mine from the conundrum of government-of-laws versus government-by-the-people. We seem
to meet at a common destination, and it is easy to see why. Radin concludes that "if law cannot be
formal rules its people cannot be mere functionaries." The flip side of that is that if the people are not
mere functionaries (but rather are self-governing), then their law cannot be formal rules.
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two premises regarding political freedom:22 first, that the American people
are politically free insomuch as they are governed by themselves collec-
tively, 23 and, second, that the American people are politically free inso-
much as they are governed by laws and not men [sic]. 24 I take it that no
earnest, non-disruptive participant in American constitutional debate is
quite free to reject either of those two professions of belief. I take them to
be premises whose problematic relation to each other, and therefore whose
meanings, are subject to an endless contestation that always organizes,
sometimes explicitly but always implicitly, American constitutional
argument.25
The problematic relationship between the two American constitutional-
ist premises-the government of the people by the people and the govern-
22. For a rough definition of political freedom, see supra note 2.
23. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961):
It is evident that no [nonrepublican] form [of government] would be reconcilable with the
genius of the American people; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that
honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political exper-
iments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.
It is enough for my purposes that Madison and his fellow federalists "agreed, explicitly, that the
people could create, alter, or abolish their government whenever they chose to do so," and that they
did so by way of concession to the country's prevailing democratic-republican sentiment. See Miller,
The Ghostly Body Politic: The Federalist Papers and Popular Sovereignty, 16 POL. THEORY 99, 104
& passim (1988). Professor Miller goes on to urge that the Federalists made this concession only
rhetorically, and only subject to the stipulation that:
for the acts of 'the people' to be valid, they had to act all at once and together. Thus the
Federalists rendered the democratic vocabulary of popular sovereignty harmless by invoking a
fictitious people who could not possibly act together. The Federalists ascribed all power to a
mythical entity that could never meet, never deliberate, never take action. The body politic
became a ghost.
Even after allowing for the obvious hyperbole of Professor Miller's reading of the framers' design
with respect to popular sovereignty (how did they regard the initial ratification, then?), that reading is
subject to strong contestation. See infra text accompanying notes 106-12 (describing Ackerman's two-
track theory). Even were it not, its deepest premise would remain that of the recognized commitment
of Americans to the principle of popular self-government. See Zuckerman, Charles Beard and the
Constitution: The Uses of Enchantment, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 81, 95, 99 (1987):
[The founders] were realists ... in their experience of their social milieu. They moved in a
world in which rhetoric bore some reasonable relation to reality, a world especially in which
political language bore some substantial resemblance to political life....
... The Federalist Papers were written [by the founders] precisely out of passion and neces-
sity to take [their] acquired expertise to the people and share it with them, rather than shut
them out of it.
24. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); 2 J. ADAMS, PAPERS OF
JOHN ADAMS 314 (R. Taylor ed. 1977); see Richards, supra note 2, at 842-43.
25. See Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1987) ("[T]o understand
what a Constitution is, one must look at the ambiguities, the specific oppositions that this specific
concept helps us to hold in tension"); cf. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 227 (1985):
The course of democratic thought over the past two centuries. .. makes plain that there is no
agreement on the way the basic institutions of a constitutional democracy should be ar-
ranged. . . . [W]e may think of [the] disagreement as a conflict within the tradition of demo-
cratic thought itself, between the tradition associated with Locke, which gives greater weight to
what Constant called "the liberties of the moderns,". . . certain basic rights of the person...
and the rule of law, and the tradition associated with Rousseau, which gives greater weight to




ment of the people by laws-should be evident.2 6 We ordinarily think of
ourselves (qua "people") and laws as being entirely different orders of
things. Yet if we are sincerely and consistently committed both to ruling
ourselves and to being ruled by laws, there must be some sense in which
we think of self-rule and law-rule (if not exactly of "people" and "laws")
as amounting to the same thing. 7 It should be apparent that the problem
is not just a verbal artifact. Each of the two constitutionalist formu-
las-self-government and a government of laws-seems to express a de-
mand that we are all bound to respect as a primal requirement of political
freedom: the first demands the people's determination for themselves of
the norms that are to govern their social life, while the second demands
the people's protection against abuse by arbitrary power. Reconciliation is
not accomplished simply by regarding the people as making or consenting
to their own laws. The process of popular law-making is what we call
politics; and politics is, in the traditional (and healthy) American under-
standing, a theater of power in which some people stand always in danger
of abuse by others. If "a government of laws" stands-as surely it
does-for the institutionalized discipline that would render legislative
politics trustworthy, then "law" in the "government of laws" formula
must stand in a circular relation with politics as both outcome and input,
both product and prior condition."8
26. See, e.g., G. WOOD, supra note 3, at 362:
"Civil liberty" became for Americans "not 'a government of laws,' made agreeable to charters,
bills of rights or compacts, but a power existing in the people at large, at any time, for any
cause, or for no cause, but their own sovereign pleasure, to alter or annihilate both the mode
and essence of any former government and adopt a new one in its stead."
(quoting Hichborn, Oration, March 5th, 1777, in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 1750-76, at 47 (H. Niles ed. 1876)).
27. Moreover, if we are serious about opposing the government of laws to that of men [sic], yet at
the same time insistent upon having a government of the people by the people as well as a government
of laws, then we must be using "men" in some sense opposed to that in which we use "people" when
we think of people-rule as consonant with law-rule.
28. It would be a plain misreading to reduce the American constitutionalist premise of the govern-
ment of laws to the "rule of law" or Rechtsstaat idea concerned only with the regularity of legal
administration and, derivatively, with the form of legislation. Accord Epstein, Beyond the Rule of
Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 154, 162, 169 (1987).
On the Rechtsstaat view, the demand for a rule of law is satisfied by certain conditions of legal
administration and derivatively of legal form, without regard to normative content. The rule of law
then exists as long as all legislative enactments, whatever their content, are rigorously and imperson-
ally applied to all cases falling within their tbrms, and those terms are sufficiently abstract and deci-
sive ("formally realizable") to support the requisite degree of impersonality and predictability in ad-
ministration. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITuTION OF LIBERTY 193-204 (1960) (describing
Rechtsstaat ideal and its history). If this purely formal conception of the rule of law were all that
were meant by the constitutionalist demand for a "government of laws," then that demand would be
easily reconcilable with the demand for popular self-government: The people make the laws politi-
cally, subject to certain demands of formality in both the terms in which the laws are couched and the
manner in which they are administered. Doubtless we do sometimes use the term in that sense, as, for
example, Chief Justice Marshall may perhaps be taken to have done in Marbury v. Madison, when
he wrote that our government would cease to deserve the name of "a government of laws, and not of
men" if its "laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at
163. But surely it will be agreed that in American constitutional rhetoric the notion of "a government
of laws" has also shared the meaning of formulas like "higher law," see, e.g., Corwin, The "Higher
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Perhaps we can think our way through this difficulty by taking seri-
ously the cue we have already noticed in our constitutionalist formulas,
that is, the conceptual identification (although of course not outright iden-
tity or equivalence) of "people" with "laws," which at the same time
holds "people" distinct from mere "men." One possible way of making
sense of this is by conceiving of politics as a process in which private-
regarding "men" become public-regarding citizens and thus members of a
people. It would be by virtue of that people-making quality that the pro-
cess would confer upon its law-like issue the character of law binding
upon all as self-given. A political process having such a quality is one
that, adapting a term of Robert Cover's, we may call jurisgenerative. 9
Reconciling the two premises of constitutionalism seems to require that
we entertain the possibility of a jurisgenerative politics, capable of imbu-
ing its legislative product with a "sense of validity" as "our" law. 3
The idea of jurisgenerative politics is historically recognizable as an
idea of republican lineage."1 Yet it isn't some nostalgic "republican revi-
val," but rather American constitutionalism as we have all along thought
it, that we lose-or at any rate lose the ability to explain and justify-if
we cannot now reclaim that idea on terms we can accept.12 Republican-
Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. I & 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365
(1928-29), and "limited government," see, e.g., J. NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMrrs
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A VIEW FROM THE FORMATION (forthcoming 1989). Shorn of
these nuances, the constitutionalist tradition would be unrecognizable. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, supra, at
165 (affirming, as contained in "the ideal of government by law," Aristotle's doctrine that what ought
to govern is "the law," as distinguished from "the people" and "majority vote"); Brennan, The Con-
stitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 433, 436 (1986) ("It is
the very purpose of our Constitution ... to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of
temporary political majorities."); cf. S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FArrIH 150-51 (1988) (review-
ing theories of "unconstitutional constitutional amendments"). See generally NoMos XX: CONsTrru-
TIONALISM (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979).
29. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 4-19 (1983).
. 30. S. BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA 272 (1985). Benhabib apparently draws her
notion of validity from her critical examination of Habermas' theory of communicative reason.
Habermas has contended that only "unconstrained dialogue" conducted under certain "ideal" condi-
tions can hope to produce socially "valid" resolutions of controversial claims-that is, resolutions con-
sisting of "rationally motivated consensus" as distinguished from "mere compromise or ... agreement
of convenience." Benhabib draws a special connection between this idea of "discursive justification of
validity claims" and "the normative self-understanding of democracies that public decisions are
reached by autonomous .. . citizens in a process of unconstrained exchange of opinions .... [Tihe
theory of communicative ethics is primarily concerned with norms of public-institutional life." Id. at
283; see also id. at 284-85 (explicating Habermas' theory of communicative competence). For a quite
different-non-discursive-theory of public or social normative validation, see infra note 53.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 37-43. Ancient and early modern republican influences
and inspirations are manifest in recent evocations of variants of this idea. See, e.g., H. ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION (1958); B. BARBER, supra note 4; H. PITKIN, FORTUNE Is A WOMAN: GENDER
AND POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF NICCoLo MACHIAVELLI (1984); Cover, supra note 29.
32. See B. BARBER, supra note 4, at 118:
Strong democracy has a good deal in common with the classical democratic theory of the an-
cient Greek polis, but it is in no sense identical with that theory .... [I]n practical terms it is
sometimes complementary to rather than a radical alternative to the liberal argument .... It
incorporates a Madisonian wariness about actual human nature into a more hopeful, Jefferso-
nian outlook on human potentialities.... [It is] drawn from a variety of established practices
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ism, I mean thus to argue, is not optional with us. Whatever else the term
may or may not fairly signify as a category in the history of political
thought, "republicanism" does, I take it, signify the sort of belief in juris-
generative politics that it seems must play a role in any explanation of
how the constitutionalist principles of self-rule and law-rule might
coincide.
C. Republicanism and Modernity
1. The Dialogic Tradition
In the strongest versions of republicanism, citizenship-participation as
an equal in public affairs, in pursuit of a common good-appears as a
primary, indeed constitutive, interest of the person. Political engagement is
considered a positive human good because the self is understood as par-
tially constituted by, or as coming to itself through, such engagement.3
This view opposes the "pluralist" view in which the primary interests of
individuals appear as pre-political, and politics, accordingly, as a second-
ary instrumental medium for protecting or advancing those "exogenous"
interests. 4
A related opposition of ideas is that between "negative" and "positive"
liberty. Negative liberty refers to absence of restraint against doing as one
wants, while positive liberty implies action governed by reasons or laws
that one gives to oneself. 5 The two concepts of liberty differ hugely in
their implications respecting the good of citizenship. From a negative-
libertarian standpoint, participation in politics is not a good (except upon
the sheer accident of a given person's happening to like it). But positive
liberty is hardly conceivable without citizenship. Hanna Pitkin still of-
fers the best contemporary statement of the position I know:
What distinguishes politics, as Arendt and Aristotle said, is . . . the
possibility of a shared, collective, deliberate, active intervention in
our fate, in what would otherwise be the by-product of private deci-
and nourished by classical theories of community, civic education, and participation.... It has
no share in the republican nostalgia of such commentators as Hannah Arendt or Leo Strauss.
33. See, e.g., id. at 132-33.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 50-51.
35. See, e.g., I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969); 1.
BERLIN, Introduction, in id. ix; 0. TAYLOR, What's Wrong With Negative Liberty, in C. TAYLOR,
supra note 4, at 211.
36. Advocates of strong republicanism have historically emphasized various kinds of reasons for
tying the personal and the political so closely together. Hannah Arendt, for example, has expounded
on the Aristotelian notion of civic action as good for the soul-as, indeed, the distinctively human
mode of excellence or "public happiness." See H. ARENDT, supra note 31; H. ARENDT, ON REVOLU-
TION (1963). Others, notably Rousseau and Kant, have stressed the ethical importance of governing
oneself. Motivation by pre-reflective, uncriticized inclination is, they contend, a kind of enslavement,
not of freedom, and we are free only insofar as we direct our actions in accordance with reasons or
ends that we, as it were, legislate to ourselves upon conscious, critical reflection. See, e.g., C. TAYLOR,
supra note 4, at 318 (discussing Rousseau as well as Kant).
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sions. Only in public life can we jointly, as a community, exercise
the human capacity to "think what we are doing," and take charge
of the history in which we are all constantly engaged by drift and
inadvertence .... [Tihe distinctive promise of political freedom re-
mains the possibility of genuine collective action, an entire commu-
nity consciously and jointly shaping its policy, its way of life. . . . A
family or other private association can inculcate principles of justice
shared in a community, but only in public citizenship can we jointly
take charge of and responsibility for those principles.
Kant suggests something analogous in his concept of moral auton-
omy: that we are not mature as moral actors until we have become
self-governing, have [taken] ...responsibility not only for our ac-
tions but also for the norms and principles according to which we
act. As long as we live only by habit or tradition, unaware that they
mask an implicit choice, there is something about ourselves as actors
in the world that we are not seeing and for which we are not ac-
knowledging our responsibility.
7
I am not here recommending strong republicanism. I do not know what
is good for the soul. I do not know in what (if anything) personal freedom
essentially consists. I do not know whether citizenship is a fundamental
human good. What I do claim is that the republican conception of politics,
a conception that has apparently been motivated historically by certain
convictions about those matters that we may or may not be able to share,
is one that good, contemporary constitutional explanation and analysis
cannot do without.
2. The Dialogic Constitution: Republicanism and Jurisgenesis
In republican thought, the normative character of politics depends on
the independence of mind and judgment, the authenticity of voice, and-in
some versions of republicanism-the diversity or "plurality" of views that
citizens bring to "the debate of the commonwealth." 8 Republicanism has
been, par excellence, the strain in constitutional thought that has been
sensitive to both the dependence of good politics on social and economic
conditions capable of sustaining "an informed and active citizenry that
would not permit its government either to exploit or dominate one part of
society or to become its instrument," and the dependence of such condi-
37. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 344-45 (1981) (cita-
tion omitted).
38. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 41-47. We shall see below how an inclusory, plurality-
protecting conception of republican citizenship can anchor Justice Blackmun's account of the value of
intimate association, the heart of his powerful dissenting opinion in Bowers. Inclusory republicanism
seems especially pertinent to the opinion's evocative references to "association that promotes a way of
life," Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)), and to "self-definition" dependent upon "close ties with
others," id. at 2851 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
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tions, in turn, on the legal order. 9 These perceptions irresistibly motivate
a republican attachment to rights.40 These include, most obviously, rights
of speech 4' and of property.4 2  They may also include privacy
rights-perhaps stronger ones than many contemporary liberals would
welcome.
4 1
Yet republican thought is no less committed to the idea of the people
acting politically as the sole source of law and guarantor of rights, than it
is to the idea of law, including rights, as the precondition of good politics.
Republican thought thus demands some way of understanding how laws
and rights can be both the free creations of citizens and, at the same time,
the normative givens that constitute and underwrite a political process ca-
pable of creating constitutive law.44 Perfectly prefiguring the American
constitutionalist dilemma I have already described, classical republican
constitutional jurisprudence evidently depends on the possibility of juris-
generative politics.
3. Modern Republicanism and Liberal Plurality
It is certainly true that not all historical versions of republicanism have
reflected the inclusory, plurality-protecting ideal that arguably character-
39. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 57, 71-72 (1987); see Michelman, supra note 5, at 40-41; Michelman, Possession vs.
Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IowA L. REV. 1319, 1329 (1987) [hereinafter
Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution].
40. See Sunstein, supra note 5. Pocock has noticed the way in which the constitution of both the
republic and of citizenship-the grounding in practical imagination of the republic's external rela-
tions, its membership boundaries, and the virtuous independence of its citizens-seems to demand
expression in a juristic language of law and rights that sits problematically with the "humanist"
vocabulary of civic virtue:
[Clitizenship in the Italian republics was for the most part defined in jurisdictional and juris-
prudential terms.... An Italian commune was a juristic entity, inhabited by persons subject to
rights and obligations; to define these and to define the authority that protected them was to
define the citizen and his city, and the practice as opposed to the principles of citizenship was
overwhelmingly conducted in this language.
Pocock, Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of Political Thought, 9 POL. THE-
ORY 353, 355 (1981); see id. at 357, 360.
41. See, e.g., A MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1965).
42. See Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution, supra note 39, at 1329-34.
43, For a discussion of Arendt's defense of familial and local-communitarian "privacy" rights,
including the exclusionary rights of racial-segregationist communities, as protecting "plurality"-and
hence fending off totalitarianism and visionary stasis-in civic debate at the state level, see Failinger,
Equality Versus the Right to Choose Associates: A Critique of Hannah Arendt's View of the Supreme
Court's Dilemma, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 143, 158-62 (1987); see also infra text accompanying notes
134-44 (discussing value of plurality in republican constitutional theory).
44. "Law . . . is the creation of the free citizenry. Yet law is valued for its role in protecting the
public realm." Cornell, Should a Marxist Believe in Rights?, 4 PRAXIS INT'L 45, 50 (1984); cf
Pocock, Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A Study of the Relations Between the Civic
Humanist and the Civic Jurisprudential Interpretation of Eighteenth Century Social Thought, in
WEALTH AND VIRTUE 235, 248-49 (I. Hont & M. Ignatieff eds. 1983) ("[Iln republican thinking
• . . the rights exist for the sake of the equality and the virtue which is its expression, not the other
way round.").
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izes the tradition at its best. It is also true that extension of the circle of
citizens to encompass genuine diversity greatly complicates republican
thinking about the relation between rights (or law) and politics. For if
republican jurisprudence depends on jurisgenerative politics, jurisgenera-
tive politics in turn seems to depend on the existence of a normative con-
sensus that can hardly survive the diversification of the political commu-
nity by inclusion of persons of widely and deeply differing experiences
and outlooks.45
What, after all can jurisgenerative politics be, if not a process of disclos-
ing a latent, pre-existent, actual societal consensus respecting the right
terms of social ordering?4 What are the social conditions of such an effec-
tive, pre-existent consensus? Historically, those conditions have been con-
ceived as devices for avoiding or denying plurality in the political sphere,
usually involving some combination of political hierarchy, civic regimenta-
tion, and organicist culture.47 Modern American political culture is mili-
tantly anti-organicist, committed to political democracy, hostile to social-
role constraint, and broadly reconciled to deep and conflictual diversity of
social experience and normative perspective."8 If any social condition de-
fines modern American politics, plurality does. How, then, might modern
American politics be jurisgenerative? What is it, in particular, that we
might think that could make a jurisgenerative virtue of plurality?
Perhaps the answer is that republican constitutionalism as I have
presented it is just not possible any more, or for us: either not at all (that
is, its possibility depends on false or incredible assumptions about social
facts), or only on conditions of social ordering or control that are too oner-
ous or repellent to accept. 49 Such a demonstration I would regard as
neither a refutation of this essay nor a sign of its failure; if republican
constitutionalism isn't possible for us then it isn't, and we may as well
know plainly on what rock our ship has for some time been foundering.
If I have not grossly misread the aspirational content of American con-
stitutional discourse, expressed in its organizing tension of self-rule and
law-rule, denials of republican constitutionalism's modern possibility will
45. See, e.g., Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizen-
ship, 99 ETHICS (forthcoming 1989); Cover, supra note 29, at 13-19.
46. Cf. J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 4-6, 24-25 (1983) (explaining "uni-
tary" as distinguished from "adversary democracy" as process of disclosing latent consensus through
argument and discussion).
47. See, e.g., R. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NEcEssrrARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SER-
VICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 92-95 (1987) (reviewing "dosed options" in ancient city-states).
48. This assessment is generally borne out by R. BELLAH, supra note 4. But see id. at 277 (peo-
ple realize that "though the processes of separation and individualization were necessary to free us
from the tyrannical structures of the past, they must be balanced by a renewal of commitment and
community if they are not to end in self-destruction").
49. See, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 23, at 95-100 (arguing that specialization of life in modern
"technological order" is at odds with "the human integrity at the heart of Madisonian assumptions,"
is "antithetical to the classical conception of self-government," and "precludes ... the informed and
active citizenry whose part in the political process the framers presupposed").
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at any rate not be lightly entertained. The next three parts of this essay
are, accordingly, devoted to the "deduction" of a set of understandings
capable of sustaining that possibility as a credible aspiration worthy of a
modern, plural society. In Part II, I consider whether the republican syn-
thesis of self-rule and law-rule is sustainable strictly within the under-
standing of modern pluralist political science according to which all social
interaction is insuperably private-regarding or strategic; I conclude that it
is not. In Part III, I consider whether the synthesis is sustainable on the
classical American understanding-that of Federalist No. 78, as recently
refurbished by Bruce Ackerman-according to which periodic, exceptional
episodes of relatively public-regarding popular politics issue in higher-law
declarations that become and remain fixed as constitutional-legal author-
ity until revised by another such episode. Again, I conclude that it is not.
In Part IV, I offer a more thoroughly dialogic and non-authoritarian con-
ception of constitutionalist practice-one that responds affirmatively
rather than negatively to social plurality, and also one in which courts
play an active and generative role. In developing the dialogic conception I
both draw upon the literature of the classical republican tradition and also
trace some connections between it and contemporary work on both legal
interpretation and the theory of self-government. Finally, in Part V, I
return to Bowers v. Hardwick and sketch the republican-inspired argu-
ment for an opposite result in that case-an argument whose familiar feel
I hope will help provide some sense of validation for the whole effort.
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM VS. PLURALIST POLITICAL SCIENCE
A. Pluralism
By "pluralism" here I don't mean the acceptance and celebration of
diversity within a society. It should already be plain that nothing could be
further from the aim and spirit of this essay than to question the value of
pluralism in that sense. Rather, I mean by pluralism the deep mistrust of
people's capacities to communicate persuasively to one another their di-
verse normative experiences: of needs and rights, values and interests, and,
more broadly, interpretations of the world. Pluralism, that is, doubts or
denies our ability to communicate such material in ways that move each
other's views on disputed normative issues towards felt (not merely strate-
gic) agreement without deception, coercion, or other manipulation.3 It
50. See, e.g., S. BENHABIB, supra note 30, at 313-15, 320-21, 332-36 (holding open communica-
tive possibility that pluralism denies, while noting situations-involving "those who feel that the rec-
onciliation in social life has been achieved at their expense"-in which nature of conflict between
parties is such that they cannot mutually recognize each other as "discursive partners," and thus can
have no dialogue); J. BUCHANAN, FREEDOM IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT 11-24 (1977) (expres-
sing pluralist attitude); Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 57-60, 70-74 (holding open communicative possibility in specific context of
constitutional adjudication).
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follows that in pure pluralist vision, good politics does not essentially in-
volve the direction of reason and argument towards any common, ideal, or
self-transcendent end. For true pluralists, good politics can only be a mar-
ket-like medium through which variously interested and motivated indi-
viduals and groups seek to maximize their own particular preferences."
Pluralist politics, in short, seems the negation of jurisgenerative politics.
Yet the pluralist picture of politics as market cannot do without higher
law. From the pluralist standpoint, constitutional law is to politics what
private law is to free-market activity: a body of governing rules that stands
outside the process, conferring upon the process not only its intelligibility
but also its beneficence-not only its structure and order but also its
promise of safety, fairness, and utility for participants.52 I want now to
consider whether pluralism unmodified can explain the origins and nor-
mative authority of the Constitution, without contravening one or the
other of the underlying commitments of constitutionalism, that is, without
violating either self-government or the government of laws.
B. Self-Limiting Power, Higher Law, and Jurisgenesis
The first requirement for any such explanation is that it make sense of
the centrality and constancy in American constitutional practice of the re-
membrance of its origins in public acts of deliberate creation; for that re-
membrance both deeply reflects and deeply informs American understand-
ing of what it means for a people to be both self-governing and under
law.53 It is, accordingly, an accepted fact of American constitutional his-
tory that the founders, republicanly sensitive to the American ideology of
popular self-government but also intent upon curbing popular power for
the sake of liberty (or, it may be, for the sake of interest"), conjured with
51. See, e.g., A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1949); A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); D. TRu-
MAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1958).
52. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
53. See, e.g., S. LEVINSON, supra note 28, at 180-94 (on "adding one's signature to the Constitu-
tion"). Doubtless one can envision the possibility of a constitutional practice evolving without benefit
of focal, human deliberation and evolving, moreover, in such a way as to satisfy the demand for a rule
of law-and even also, in a certain, attenuated sense, the demand for self-government. Hayek, for
example, explains law as the progressive codification of the informally originating and accumulating
moral experience and practice of a successful civilization. The result could be described as a kind of
behind-our-backs self-government: the law would be "ours" although we never deliberately gave it to
ourselves. See 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973); 3 F.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 153-76
(1979). That is not, however, how American constitutional practice professes to understand itself.
Rather, our practice insistently traces its origins to deliberate human action. See, e.g., 2 J. WILSON,
THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 762 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) ("[T]he United States exhibit to the
world the first instance ... of a nation . . . assembling voluntarily, deliberating fully, and deciding
calmly, concerning that system of government, under which they would wish that they and their
posterity should live.").
54. See, e.g., Komesar, Paths of Influence: Beard Revisited, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 124 (1987);
Tushnet, The Constitution as an Economic Document: Beard Revisited, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 106
(1987).
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the notion of popular sovereignty in order to produce the magic of power
binding and limiting itself. In the most extreme account, the founders in-
duced the popular sovereign to recognize itself for the one-time purpose of
legislating its own irrevocable future disappearance from the scene.55 Less
luridly, we think of the founders envisioning the people both constituting
themselves as sovereign and, by that same self-constitutive act, entrenching
substantive limits on the reach of their own sovereignty, thereby demar-
cating spheres of private right into which they, the people acting collec-
tively through the agency of their government, might never intrude for the
duration of the entrenchment.5"
The strategy of entrenchment thus implies-at least for pluralists-the
radical separation of law from politics. Granting that the constitutionally
entrenched law of a self-governing people must originate in popular polit-
ics, if that law is also to serve the idea of an effectively self-limiting politi-
cal will, then that law, once enacted, must immediately abscond from
politics to higher ground. It must become an autonomous force against
politics, a force elaborated through its own nonpolitical modes of reason
by its own nonpolitical, judicial organ.5 7 Again we find the republican
problem of law-politics circularity lying at the core of American
constitutionalism.
58
While there may be some semblance of mystery here,59 there is none to
which Publius is not equal, by the stroke. of Federalist No. 78:0 At the
constitutional moment, We The People establish our own sovereignty by
legislating to ourselves a supreme law. We thereby create and authorize
certain executive and sub-legislative agencies to act, subject to that law's
limitations, on various matters of concern to Us, and also certain judicial
agencies to enforce those limitations on Our behalf. This Publian reconcil-
iation of people-rule with law-rule obviously reposes on a belief that a
political process-specifically, the constitution-making process of We The
People-can produce a normative doctrine that commands respect as
law.61 The question now before us is whether it is possible to envision
that constitution-creating political process strictly within the terms of plu-
ralist political psychology, without contravening one or the other of our
55. See Miller, supra note 23.
56. See J. NEDELSKY, supra note 28.
57. See id.; Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Con-
stitution (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REv. 340 (1982).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
59. See J. NEDELSKY, supra note 56, on "the irreducible problem of a government setting and
enforcing its own limits" (manuscript at 1-8), and "the dilemma of self-limiting government-of the
political entity requiring limits being the one to set those limits" (manuscript at 1-11).
60. THE FFDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
61. "Publian" is, I believe, an Ackermanian coinage. See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1023 n.17.
For another contemporary strong reminder of the Publian answer, see Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987). For the historical necessity and invention of popular sover-
eignty theory, see G. Wood, supra note 3, at 462-63, 530-32, 599-600.
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constitutionalist premises-either the government of laws or popular self-
government. Can pluralist political science account for the possibility of
jurisgenerative politics that lies at the problematic core of American con-
stitutional thought?
C. Pluralist Higher Law: "Political" or "Metaphysical"?2
The question here is not whether the Constitution's content is well ex-
plained, in the sense of rationally justified, as having been aptly devised
for a country whose future politics were expected to be pluralist in char-
acter. Instead, it is whether and how the legitimate authority-the "sense
of validity"-of the political event consisting of the Constitution's enact-
ment might be brought within the terms of pluralist explanation.
Pluralist-inspired rationalizations of constitutional content are certainly
not unknown to the literature.6 All such accounts have at their core a line
of argumentation designed to show something like the following: Given
the various, partly complementary but partly conflicting, pre-political
aims and interests of the individuals concerned, and given also the inevita-
bly competitive and strategic motivational realities of social (including po-
litical and economic) interaction, 4 it is rational for everyone concerned to
prefer the constitution in question to the next best practically attainable
alternative.65 Such arguments are thus based on a set of characteristically
pluralist premises, some of which are descriptive or social-scientific in
content, while others are normative or philosophical insofar as they posit a
particular notion of rationality rooted in a certain conception of the self,
its ends, and its relations with others.
66
Insofar as such an argument stands outside of actual, political history, it
62. Cf Rawls, supra note 25 (contrasting "political" and "metaphysical" interpretations of Rawl-
sian justice-as-fairness).
63. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE THEORY OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN (1986); Epstein, supra note 28; Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1987); Posner, supra note 18, at 5-19. Pluralistic justificatory accounts of
constitutional content may also be constructed out of such large and notable (and otherwise diverse)
works of political and constitutional theory as J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 52; J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); and J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
65. Such an account might point to (i) the overwhelming productivity advantages attributed to
capitalist (competitive, market-based) economic organization; (ii) a perceived dominance (at least, or
especially, in a successful capitalist society) of private-regarding political motivations over public-re-
garding ones; (iii) deep diversity and conflict among the values and self-perceived interests of citizens
and factional groups (at least, or especially, in a modern capitalist society); and (iv) the resultant
dangers of grievous oppression, exploitation and waste inherent in majoritarian politics unless effec-
tively regulated by a protective constitution. A pluralist constitutional explanation might undertake to
show that on such a set of assumptions, a chief virtue of the constitution in question is its expected
effect of constraining private-regarding political motivations into simulatedly public-regarding chan-
nels, through both its structure and process rules for majoritarian legislative action, and the substan-
tive limits it sets for such action. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 63, at 54-59, 71-76; Epstein, supra
note 28.
66. The locus classicus is T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. 1-13.
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has a transcendental (or what Rawls calls a "metaphysical") character.6"
Taking its scientific and philosophical premises as given, the argument's
gist then is that each person, whether she knows it or not, ought to accept
the law in question as conformable to some assertedly objective notion of
reason, nature, fairness, utility, or other criterion of rightness. For exam-
ple, the contention may be that the law ought to be accepted by everyone
because it would be accepted by strategically motivated, rationally self-
regarding social contractors hypothetically abstracted-or imaginatively
separated by a "veil of ignorance"-from their actual worldly situations
and perspectives.6"
No such purely transcendental argument can by its own force confer
upon any constitution or other law the validity of self-givenness. 69 Lack-
ing actual societal consensus on its premises both descriptive and norma-
tive, such an argument by itself does nothing, from a republican stand-
point, to remove the law it rationalizes from the long list of instances of
government by some "men" (those who accept the argument's premises) of
others (those who reject those premises).70 Whatever kind of authority a
law may possess by force of transcendental justifiability, it is not the au-
thority of self-government. In order to approach republican validation of a
law, justificatory argument must at least begin to explain how that law
might have been actually regarded by the people subject to it, in all their
actual social and experiential situations, as deserving acceptance by
them."'
Perhaps it is possible by historicization to convert to such purposes
what first appears as a transcendental justification.72 For example, one
67. See Rawls, supra note 25, at 223.
68. To this extent, much of Rawls' argument in J. RAwLs, supra note 63, in support of the
quasi-constitutional conception of "justice as fairness" may be construed as transcendental. But see
Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987) [hereinafter
Rawls, Overlapping Consensus]; Rawls, supra note 25; Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral
Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980).
69. See S. BENHABIB, supra note 30, at 94-95, 101, 103 (criticizing Hegel), 299-300 (contrasting
Kantian ethics with communicative ethics); B. FAY, CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 183 (1987); Rorty,
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS
EvOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HSTORY 257, 258-59, 261-65 (M. Peterson & R.
Vaughan eds. 1988); Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379 (1981). The distinc-
tion between a law's objective rightness and its enjoyment of a sense of validity was one that James
Madison understood. Madison based his argument against frequent constitutional revision in part on
the extra veneration accorded to a constitution by reason of its age, apart from its objective merit. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (J. Madison); infra note 97 and accompanying text.
70. See S. BENHABIB, supra note 30, at 313-14; Rawls, supra note 25, at 225-26. This is not to
deny that "hypothetical abstraction about what individuals could accept is [capable] of illuminating
moral responsibilities or rights," Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Con-
tract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 461, 489-90 (1987), or at least of clarifying controversies about
those matters.
71. See S. BENHABIB, supra note 30, at 310-11, 341-42.
72. See Rawls, supra note 25, at 231 (seeking to "conceive how, given a desire for free and
uncoerced agreement, a public understanding could arise consistent with the historical conditions and
constraints of our social world"); Richards, supra note 2, at 820.
The argument I sketch here on behalf of the possibility of pluralist jurisgenesis is adapted from
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might try to show that the actual historical conditions under which people
had to decide whether to approve our Constitution approximated a hypo-
thetical "veil of ignorance";' 3 that the actual ratification procedures ap-
proximated consensual approval;74 and that the requisite consensus was
actually obtained by the use of argument to convince voters that the pro-
posed Constitution would indeed serve their several and various, privately
conceived interests better than any available alternative.7 5 To show that
such an account could possibly succeed would apparently be to establish
the conceptual possibility, at least, of describing a jurisgenerative political
process without ever stepping outside the terms of pluralist political
psychology.
We have already noted, however, that the success of any such account
depends on giving credible content to the notion of everyone's coming to
accept, as his or her own, all the normative and scientific beliefs underly-
ing the supposedly persuasive demonstration that this is the right or the
best constitution from anyone's private-regarding standpoint. It is obvious
that not nearly all Americans have ever deeply agreed on any set of beliefs
capable of supporting any such demonstration. Perhaps we can imagine
people being persuaded to accept the requisite beliefs arguendo, as suita-
ble to the immediate, urgent, practical work of resolving upon some con-
stitution, while continuing to doubt or deny their deep truth (or rightness,
or inevitability).76 But at just that point in our imaginings, the ethos of
the ratification debates would have passed from pluralist to republican.
We would be envisioning some participants appealing to others to agree
either that (i) the others, allowing for their differences in needs and out-
looks, have what they ought for their own sakes to regard as good reasons
for adopting, at least provisionally, the assumptions (however competi-
tivistic) and norms (however calculative) presupposed by the pluralist ra-
tionalization of the constitution's merit from everyone's standpoint, or else
that (ii) due consideration for the overriding interest of "the whole" re-
quires that they do so. Participants, then, would be regarding themselves
and each other as arguing sincerely on behalf of one another or of every-
Macey, supra note 63.
73. See Macey, supra note 63, at 72-75. Macey in effect suggests that the veil of ignorance was
simulated by a combination of two factors: (i) the proposed Constitution's having been cast in the form
of general-structural (as opposed to policy-specific) provisions whose long-range consequences for spe-
cifically partisan interests (as opposed to general interests in social order and prosperity) were virtu-
ally impossible to predict, and (ii) the pressure for concession to the demands of general order and
prosperity, and to the vital interests of others, exerted by awareness of the super-majoritarian, quasi-
consensual ratification procedure. I think that any reliance on the second of these factors would take
Macey's account of the Constitution's "public-regarding" origins and character beyond the limits of
strictly pluralist explanation, into republican territory. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
74. See Macey, supra note 63, at 76, 79.
75. See id. at 77-79.
76. See Rawls, supra note 25, at 229-30, 245-46.
77. See Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 68, at 9-12, 18-23; Rawls, supra note 25, at
247-48.
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one, or as each adopting the interest of the whole as his own interest-an
understanding that certainly seems confirmed by much of the actual rheto-
ric of the debates.
78
Such a round of persuasive arguments and discussions seems inconceiv-
able without conscious reference by those involved to their mutual and
reciprocal awareness of being co-participants not just in this one debate,
but in a more encompassing common life, bearing the imprint of a com-
mon past, within and from which the arguments and claims arise and
draw their meaning.71 The persuasive character of the process depends on
the normative efficacy of some context that is everyone's-of the past that
is constitutively present in and for every self as language, culture,
worldview, and political memory. Is this not, for example, how we almost
irresistibly recall successive generations of Americans arguing to each
other that "we" are already committed to religious plurality, toleration,
and privacy-and by extension to some broader if still limited libertarian
principle-by common narratives of refuge explaining how "we" came to
be here, in this country?8°
What we thus imagine, remember, and chronicle is republican political
conversation.
D. Republican Jurisgenesis: A Politics of Law
Jurisgenerative political debate among a plurality of self-governing sub-
jects involves the contested "re-collection" (in Drucilla Cornell's telling
phrase) of a fund of public normative references conceived as narratives,
analogies, and other professions of commitment.8" Upon that fund those
subjects draw both for identity and, by the same token, for moral and
political freedom.82 That fund is the matrix of their identity "as" a people
or political community, that is, as individuals in effectively persuasive, di-
alogic relation with each other, and it is also the medium of their political
freedom, that is, of their translation of past into future through the dia-
78. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST passim.
79. See R. BELLAH, supra note 4, at 281-82; B. FAY, supra note 69, at 160-61, 163-64.
80. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 460, 461, 463-66 (1961); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947); Cover, supra note 29, at 26-29 (quoting and discussing amicus briefs
filed on behalf of Mennonites in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), and on
behalf of the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); cf. Rawls, supra note 25, at 225,
228-29, 240-42, 249 (arguing thusly to us, now); Cover, supra note 29, at 4-5 ("For every constitu-
tion there is an epic .... ").
81. See Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination, and the Potential for
Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1171-72 (1988).
82. Hanna Pitkin endorses this view: "We are human selves, capable of choice and action, pre-
cisely insofar as we are part of a human culture which has, in our time and in us, a specific, determi-
nate form that cannot be wished away but must be recognized if we are to act." H. PrrKIN, supra
note 31, at 279 (offering "republican interpretation" of thought of Machiavelli); see also M. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrS OF JUSTICE 179-83 (1982) (affirming relation between moral freedom
and socially and historically situated nature of self).
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logic exercise of recollective "imagination." 3 The republican idea of polit-
ical jurisgenesis thus presupposes (in what might be called a transcenden-
tal moment of republican constitutional thought) that such a fund of
normatively effective material-publicly cognizable, persuasively recol-
lectible and contestable-is always already available."4
Interestingly, the idea of such a fund, together with that of the persua-
sive process of its contested recollection, seems all but indistinguishable
from one of our most influential contemporary conceptions not of politics
but of law. Ronald Dworkin's linked notions of law "as integrity," of law
as the medium of the community's constitutive commitment to "consis-
tency in principle" in its treatments of its members, and of law as the
"personification" of the community itself (that is, as the institutional man-
ifestation of the political community's existence and identity as such) all
emphasize law's historical aspect."' They all present law as the institu-
tionalized form of self-consciousness on the part of community members
about their situatedness in a common past, required by a conception of
personal and political freedom that involves our continuing to be ourselves
even as we reconsider what we are and ought to be about. At the same
time, Dworkin's insistence on the bottomlessly interpretive nature of law,
on the pervasively political character of legal interpretation, and on the
necessity of political-moral choice that befalls judges adjudicating "hard"
cases, reminds us of law's self-revisionary aspect, echoing the self-critical
dimension of moral and political freedom.88 Perhaps it should come as no
surprise that what appears under the name of politics in this essay's re-
publican-inspired account of the validity of law should appear under the
name of law in another's study of political legitimacy from the standpoint
83. Cornell, supra note 81, at 1204.
84. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 348 (1986) ("Hercules interprets not just the statute's text
but its life, the process that begins before it becomes law and extends far beyond that moment."); Cf.
B. FAY, supra note 69, at 174:
The understanding which we can have of ourselves is always 'in the middle of the way': there
are no absolute beginnings and absolute endings.... This is because we are always interpret-
ing ourselves in the light of anticipations of what we will do and what the outcomes of this
activity will be, and because we are always interpreting our deeds and thoughts in light of our
present understandings-understandings which themselves are always changing in the course
of our own and others' history.
85. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 93-96, 164-75, 189-90, 211-15, 219-28.
86. See id. at 62-68 (interpretive nature of law), 73-76 (political character of legal interpreta-
tion), 87-93 (political choices), 189 (self-revisionary aspect), 359-60 (interpretive nature of law), 413
(describing law's role in constructing new community by helping old community revise itself; see also
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527 (1982) (political character of legal interpreta-
tion). Cornell's critique of Dworkin helps us retrieve this reminder from partial obfuscation by the
lingering remnant of authoritarianism (or "positivism") in Dworkin's jurisprudence. See Cornell,
supra note 81, at 1141. Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism, and Constitutional Revolutions, 21
U.C. DAVis L. REv. 645, 731-32, 753, 757-60 (1988). denies the compatibility of Dworkin's theory
of law as integrity with the transformative aspect of constitutional adjudication as Cornell and I both
conceive of it. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
1514 [Vol. 97: 1493
Law's Republic
of jurisprudence. We already knew, after all, that republican constitution-
alism implied a politics of law.8
So what began as pluralist constitutional explanation has now ended by
returning us to the indispensable premise of Publian history: that Ameri-
cans once rose to the republican achievement of popular self-creation-of
recollecting themselves as a people-through a politics of partial self-tran-
scendence and of law.
Once, however, is hardly enough.
III. POPULAR AUTHORITARIANISM
A. Founders and Citizens: Of Constitutional Time and Alienated
Authority
1. Founders
"Proclaiming its desire to 'secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity,' the Constitution took the liberty of speaking for that
posterity."8 8 Such authoritarian posturings by American founders and
their reflection, on occasion, by a respectful judicial posterity are, on one
view of the tradition, a classical republican reminiscence. For there is no
denying that the tradition has its authoritarian side, symbolized by the
classical republican figure of the heroic Founder or Legislator:8 9 the his-
torically singular figure who by extraordinary force of intellect, will, and
personality has succeeded in imposing upon a turbulent and endangered
country a political regimen, in the form of a constitution, so designed that
faithful adherence to its precepts will tend to reproduce the civic virtue
required to sustain that very adherence." The myth of the Founder ap-
parently describes an ideal history of the republic in which there was and
will be only one act of political-moral originality; in which all the political
freedom belongs for all time to a single heroic individual, or perhaps gen-
eration;91 and in which the only act of political valor or worth remaining
87. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
88. Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40 STAN. L. REv. 181, 188 (1987).
89. See, e.g., H. PrrIKN, supra note 31, at 52-55, 68-69; J. SHKLAR, MEN AND CITIZENS: A
STUDY OF ROUSSEAU'S SOCIAL THEORY 165-69 (1969).
90. See H. PrrIN, supra note 31, at 75-77; see also Appleby, The American Heritage: The
Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HISr. 798-801 (1987); cf Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S.
Ct. 849, 864 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The fostering of an intelligent democratic process is one
of the happy effects of the constitutional prescription [of compensation for property taken]-perhaps
accidental, perhaps not."); R. EPSTEIN, supra note 63, at 344-46.
91. See H. PrrKIN, supra note 31, at 79:
The Founder ... must generate in his "sons" . . piety toward his initiative. He must be the
very opposite of a parricide because he must embody filial piety for them to emulate. And he
must slay his sons because if they sought to be fully alive and autonomously follow his exam-
ple, no lasting institution would be constructed by him.
This is Pitkin's rendition of the lesson drawn by Machiavelli from Livy's account of the public execu-
tion of the rebellious sons of Junius Brutus, founder of the Roman republic, over which their father
presided. See id. at 59-61; N. MACHIAVEULi, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST TEN BOOKS OF TITUS
LIVY 392-94 (B. Crick ed. 1970) (bk. III, ch. 3). But see infra notes 101-02.
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to the denizens of posterity is, from time to time, when by fault of corrup-
tion things threaten to fall apart, to assert a grip on themselves and, in the
Machiavellian formula, 2 return the country to its origins by rededicating
themselves to the founding principles.
2. The Question of Constitutional Duration
Consider, now, the American founders' debate over the permanence of
their own foundations. 3 Restaging that debate, it is tempting to cast Jef-
ferson as Pluralist, playing opposite Madison's Republican.9" Jefferson's
protest against the inter-generational tyranny of constitutional perma-
nence seems most compelling on a view of constitution-making as just an-
other round of pluralist politics-as-usual, while Madison's protest against
the disruptive effects of repeated future constitution-making might be
taken to valorize the Constitution-"this Constitution" 9 -as the excep-
tionally meritorious product of a peculiarly virtuous historical event.
Consider, however, a somewhat different interpretation of the dispute.
We have seen that for pluralist political science-based as it is on a politi-
cal psychology that cannot entertain the possibility of jurisgenerative polit-
ics-the only form of discursive validation available for a constitution is
the metaphysical-not-political appeal to rationality or natural law: that is,
the appeal to that constitution's just being, as a demonstrable matter of
objective reason, the right constitution for a country such as ours is fated
to be, populated by folk such as we by nature are. 6 On this view of the
matter, Madison's sense of the Constitution's exceptionality, inspiring his
defense of its permanence, would rest not on its special provenance in
jurisgenerative politics but on its special conformity to right reason. For
insofar as a law's special authority is felt to derive from its informing
reason, that law presumably ought to be left unmolested until, if ever, it is
determined (by whoever or whatever we imagine determining these
92. See, e.g., N. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 91, at 385-90 (bk. II, ch. 1).
93. See A. KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 62-96 (1950). Com-
pare T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 62-96 (W. Peden ed. 1955) (proposing
constitutional conventions whenever called for by any two of the three branches of the government)
with THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (J. Madison) (arguing against such easy access to constitutional
revision).
94. This would be, of course, a reversal of the usual tendency to contrast the obvious republican
affinities of Jeffersonian agrarianism with Madison's prescience, if not parentage, of modern pluralist
political science. See, e.g., D. McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSO-
NIAN AMERICA (1980) (Jefferson); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956)
(Madison). But see G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST XV-xxii, 254-70 (1981)
(Madison); Appleby, What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, 39
WM. & MARY Q. 287 (1982) (Jefferson). Perhaps such reversability just signifies the intimate em-
brace in which the two visions are locked in American political thought.
95. See Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special
Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 62-71. By "discursive validation" I mean reasons for re-
specting the Constitution as law other than the brutely positivistic reason that the Constitution just is
the law in force. See supra notes 30, 53.
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things) that that informing reason is vitiated by error. (Perhaps nature
turns out different from what we had thought. Perhaps the canons of rea-
son themselves undergo change.)9"
Conversely, to trace a constitution's validity as the people's law to its
republican political origins would evidently imply that constitution's im-
permanence. For we have seen that the requisite context of jurisgenerative
political conversation is a prior deposit of normative references composing
the imprint of a people's history as a normatively self-directing political
community, and of course the history of a contemporary people can never
have been completely contained in the history of an ancestral generation.98
A constitution cannot retain its claim to republican validity without
changing in response to historical change in the people's composition and
values, its identity and "fate as a People."99
3. Citizens
Taken as a self-sufficient emblem of the republican constitution, the
figure of the once-and-future Founder would thus be both puzzling and
disheartening-an epitome of both alienated authority and political-moral
stasis, in both respects antithetical to a-modern sense of personal and po-
litical freedom. Happily, the tradition's figurative vocabulary supplies the
additional component needed for a more satisfactory view in its image of
the Citizen.
Granted, the traditional republican image of the Citizen contains its
97. Madison expressed himself on this point with an easy and elusive ambiguity-nicely echoed
in David Richards' reprise of Madison's view. See Richards, supra note 2, at 818-20. In THE FED-
ERALIST No. 49, Madison presented three arguments, in ascending order of importance, against Jef-
ferson's proposal for constitutional conventions upon the call of any two of the three branches of the
central government. See T. JEFFERSON, supra note 93. First, frequent proposals for repairing the
Constitution would imply its imperfection and thereby tend to undermine its veneration by public
opinion. "In a nation of philosophers, ... [a] reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated
by the voice of an enlightened reason .... [I]n every other nation, the most rational government will
not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side." THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 49, supra note 23, at 315 (J. Madison). Second, the successful round of constitution-
making recently completed in America occurred in conditions of emergency that tended to suppress the
worst of public passions and stimulate civically virtuous devotion to the work-a set of conditions that
may not attend future constitution-making. Id. Third, "the decisions which would probably result
from such appeals would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the
government." Id. For various reasons, Madison expected that "the passions,... not the reason, of the
public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and
regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government." Id.
at 317 (emphases in original).
98. See B. FAY, supra note 69, at 173:
The narratives intent on illuminating human lives are historically sensitive in that their nature
changes in relation to the historically changing circumstances of both the narrators and the
narratees. This historical sensitivity means that the ideal of a perfectly clear self-knowledge
deriving from knowing 'the genuine narrative' of one's life is not compelling. Who humans are
and what roles they play are continually shifting because of their ever-changing location in
history and because of the ever-changing perspective of those trying to tell their story.
99. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1180; see Brennan, supra note 28, at 438; Lipkin, supra note
86, at 706-11.
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own ambiguity."' 0 But from a modern standpoint, it seems a disservice
both to republican thought and to ourselves-it seems our failure to ex-
tract from that thought the best it has to offer us-to regard the Machia-
vellian doctrine of return to origins as attributing distinct and complemen-
tary kinds of republican virtue to the founder inventing the social order
and to the citizens reciprocally submitting. The more challenging reading,
recently clarified by Hanna Pitkin's probing of Machiavelli's own
thoughts on the matter, sees citizens as founders, corruption as alienation
of authority, and virtue as the spirit of constitutional renovation. 01 The
republican images of founder and citizen may in this way be used to ex-
press the generative tension of political freedom. Foundership stands for
freedom as security-the security of the people, of their lives and of their
society, against annihilation by enemies external and internal: domination,
corruption, entropy, chaos. A founding unifies, invents ex nihilo, thrives
as authority, requires submission, succeeds by endurance. Citizenship
stands for freedom as activity: the constant redetermination by the people
for themselves of the terms on which they live together. Citizens are a
plurality, appeal argumentatively to available reasons, thrive on contesta-
tion, require mutuality, succeed by self-recollection. In sum, the dialectic
of foundership and citizenship may be taken as republicanism's tradi-
tional, figurative expression of what I have presented as American consti-
tutionalism's problematic and dynamic core-that is, its endless interplay
between the principles of legality (entailing respect for historical commit-
ment) and self-government (entailing respect for the human capacity for
self-renewal).102
100. See, e.g., J. SHKLAR, supra note 89, at 180-83 (presenting Rousseau's image of citizenship
as epitomizing motivation to abide by founding principles).
101. Pitkin writes:
Perhaps one should construe the forgetfulness that gradually corrupts a composite body as
reification: a coming to take for granted as "given" and inevitable what is in fact the product of
human action. Thus people may come to consider their civic order beyond their choice or
control and, therefore, beyond their responsibility, secure without any special effort on their
part. Then each may feel free to poach on the public spirit . . . of others, behaving as if
someone else were in charge and losing touch with his own stake in public life, [perhaps
succumbing to] . . . the existential fear inherent in recognizing the full extent of human re-
sponsibility, the fragility of human order and its dependence on our commitment. From that
perspective, the return to origins would be a return not to the initial institutions but to the
spirit of origins, the human capacity to originate .... As Strauss says, Machiavelli eventually
reveals that "foundation is, as it were, continuous foundation" and is carried on jointly by
many.
. . . From this perspective, believing in the superhuman Founder and seeking to imitate
him by dutiful obedience rather than by discovering one's own capacity to found are not
merely failures to recognize the actual origins of one's community and its tradition, but also
failures in self-knowledge.
H. PrrKIN, supra note 31, at 276-78.
102. Again, Pitkin finds the makings of this view in the republican thought of Machiavelli:
[I]f the discovery of this capacity in ourselves [to create and sustain civilization] is a self-
recognition, it is accompanied by a simultaneous discovery of our particular, historically
shaped selves, and the particular, historically shaped way of life of our community. ...
The community, like the choosing self, already exists in its historical particularity. Both can
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B. Periodic Citizenship
One all-conditioning, prepossessing fact-the fact of history, or tempo-
rality-invites us to use sequential alternation to preserve both principles
of the republican constitutionalist antithesis. Nothing, it seems, could be
simpler: From time to time refoundings occur, and in the wake of each
follows a period of law-abiding citizenship.
103
Insofar as our own Constitution expressly contemplates anything like
occasional refoundings, it does so in article V. But article V seems, upon
consideration, decidedly not a license to refound. If article V seems from
one standpoint the Constitution's admission of its own alterability," 4 from
another standpoint article V seems the Constitution's presumption of its
own entrenchment. We might, indeed, regard article V as the epitome of
the founding arrogance: the arrogance not just of qualified entrenchment
of the founders' ideas about constitutional-legal content, but absolute en-
trenchment of their ideas about constitutional-legislative process.10 5
Bruce Ackerman's elaboration of Publian popular-sovereignty theory is
commendable for its special sensitivity to such an encroachment by article
V on the preserve of republican citizenship. 0 8 Out of that sensitivity
comes Ackerman's insistence upon judicially cognizable constitutional al-
teration whenever a civically aroused constitutional majority of the people
and their leaders have found a way to adapt-or bend, or stretch-the
Constitution's institutional forms, especially those providing for the sepa-
ration of powers (whose use for this constitutional-legislative purpose may
be changed, and some changes will be an enhancement of the self, a return to fundamental
principles. Becoming aware that one has a choice about one's habits and commitments need not
mean abandoning them but may equally well lead to their reendorsement, to holding the same
commitments in a new way.
Id. at 279.
Pitkin suggests that in a certain equivocation in Machiavelli's account of the history of Flo-
rence-between the city's origin as a colonial outpost under Caesarist imperial auspices and its earlier
origin as an indigenous Tuscan creation-there is a lesson to be read about an important avenue for
self-recollection by citizens: "Perhaps it would be enough-would in important ways even be prefera-
ble-to be merely Tuscan and Florentine rather than Roman, to be oneself rather than bound to a
mythical hero?" Id. at 95; see also id. at 259-62. In other words, citizens can redefine their political
community by discovering or remembering new or different founders and founding moments. See
infra text accompanying notes 117-23, 150-56; see also Minow, supra note 10, at 1877:
The civil rights movement ... created a legacy of meanings for the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflecting the commitment of civil rights activists and the officials persuaded by them to incor-
porate elements of the movement into the formal legal system. Invocation of ... that history
can add to the persuasive force [of] rights discourse even when that discourse depends on
nothing beyond current and future human choices.
103. Pitkin argues that such a sequential deployment of the images risks losing touch with citizen-
ship, for reasons that recall the familiar Thayerite objection to activist judicial review. Compare H.
Pitkin, supra note 31, at 97-98 with J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901). See infra note
127 and accompanying text.
104. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 119, 137 (1943) (relying on Article V to "re-
fute the idea that ... one who advocates radical changes" in the Constitution cannot honestly swear
loyalty to it); S. LEVINSON, supra note 28, at 135-38.
105. See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1059-60.
106. See id. at 1057-63.
The Yale Law Journal
bear no more than a remote analogical resemblance to the procedures pre-
scribed for the same purpose by article V) to the conduct of what Acker-
man calls constitutional, and I call republican and jurisgenerative, politics:
the mobilization, formation, and expression of a public-regarding, popular
determination to legislate a "decisive break with [the country's] constitu-
tional past."' 10 7 Ackerman's is the most deeply popularist, and genuinely
republican, constitutional theory now going. In its popularism lies its ap-
peal; but therein also lies, I am afraid, its danger from the standpoint of a
concern about the excessively authoritarian jurisprudence of Bowers v.
Hardwick. From that standpoint, the objection to deep popularism as a
validating constitutional premise is that when translated into the form of a
historical sequence, that premise finds expression-at least in the current
Ackermanian version-as authoritarian constitutional jurisprudence.
Let us consider what motivates Ackerman's inquiry into the possibility
of non-formal, "structural" amendment of the people's Constitution. Ack-
erman asks how one might justify historic Supreme Court decisions that
have given effect to constitutional change in what he takes to be a progres-
sive direction. Specifically, he seeks a way of justifying these decisions by
arguments that maintain the republican sense of the validity of constitu-
tional law not only as popularly self-given but also as always above and
prior to arbitrary, personal will or preference. Accordingly, he demands
arguments that steer clear of the "legal nihilism" courted by readings of
constitutional text and precedent that purport to be interpretations but are
so "fast and loose" that they smack of interpretative fraud.10 8
Without assistance from the notion of informal amendment, Ackerman
believes, we cannot explain the legitimacy of judicial revolutions like the
New Deal Court's wholesale rejection of Lochner-era jurisprudence in
favor of judicial affirmation of the constitutional rectitude of the welfare
state, and the Warren Court's detection of thitherto unrecognized mean-
ings in "the equal protection of the laws." This is so, in Ackerman's view,
because only the people speaking in their higher law-making modal-
ity-only the legislative utterance of a "mobilized constitutional major-
ity"-can authorize a sharp judicial departure from a prior constitutional-
legal understanding that itself must be taken, for the sake of its own some-
time legitimacy, as having emanated from the still prior law-making pro-
nouncements of a civically mobilized citizenry.109 Without an actual, in-
tervening event of jurisgenerative popular politics, Ackerman can see no
solution to what he perceives as an otherwise insoluble problem of legiti-
macy: the legitimacy, that is, of the judicial creativities of both the New
Deal and the Warren Courts, which he believes must, without his solution
107. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1172; see also Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1053-56.
108. See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1070.
109. Id. at 1053, 1070-71.
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of recognizing intervening constitutional amendments authored by the
people informally, stand condemned as constitutionally unauthorized judi-
cial usurpations of democratic authority.
Now consider what Ackerman's position says about how the Supreme
Court should dispose of Bowers v. Hardwick. Straightforwardly, it implies
that the judiciary can never take upon itself the instigation of a constitu-
tional moment by proposing, in the form of a renovative judicial decision,
a "decisive break" with the people's prior pronouncements on political
morality. In Ackerman's theory, the judiciary is cast as the agent of our
constitutional past. What is more to the point, Ackerman, evoking the ni-
hilist menace, leaves us to infer that as the faithful agent of our past the
judiciary cannot also be a spontaneous agent of our future.'10 The judici-
ary appears in the theory as the specially entrusted agent and organ of the
people's past law-giving, as such the special guardian of the very principle
of legality-of its credibility-against corrosion by suspicious interpreta-
tion or pseudo-interpretation. It would seem that a court outspokenly
"recollecting" the authorities with a conscious eye on the future would be
dangerously consorting with "legal nihilism." From that it would seem to
follow that the judiciary's role in the process of constitutional change can
only be benedictory, never prophetic.' A justice conscientiously commit-
ted to that theory must have, so far as I can see, a hard time escaping the
authoritarian logic of Justice White's majority opinion in Bowers. More-
over, that condition must last until, if ever, there occurs a nationally or-
ganized, popular political mobilization that can fairly be said to have re-
solved the issue of political morality presented in that case. Hardwick
must abide an historically concrete occasion of constitutional politics, ar-
ticulated in highly visible and contentious official (or better, for Acker-
man's theory, debatably official) acts of the legislative and executive
branches (perhaps enriched and propelled by backward-looking judicial
reactions thereto), capable of engaging a decisive popular response to his
appeal to political freedom." 2
110. My appraisal of Ackerman's constitutional theory in this respect parallels Drucilla Cornell's
appraisal of the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. See Cornell, supra note 81, at 1140-42. Dworkin
too links futurism with nihilism through his jurisprudential category of legal "instrumentalism." See
R. DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 95, 98, 152-53, 160-62, 318.
111. In Ackerman's New Deal paradigm of structural amendment, the Court's crucial role is
precisely that of putting up a very public and articulate defense of the old order against the futuristic
pretensions of the political branches-a barrier of resistance for the political branches to overcome, if
they can, by successfully evoking a decisive popular endorsement of their assault on the Court's
guardianship of the hitherto established understanding. Only after such a popular mandate has been
delivered does the acquiescent Court officiate over the final consolidation of the change. See Acker-
man, supra note 5, at 1153-57; Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1174. When Ackerman does expressly
contemplate the possibility of "Court-led constitutional transformation," he restricts that possibility to
the case in which an already successfully consummated series of "transformative" judicial appoint-
ments has disclosed a popular will in favor of change, leaving us to puzzle over what he means in this
context by judicial leadership. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1172 n.1 1 (emphasis in original).
112. Ackerman declines to suggest that the events surrounding the Senate's rejection of President
Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork to a seat on the Supreme Court might amount to that occasion,
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In his perception that the judicial creativities of the New Deal and
Warren Courts present a legitimacy problem otherwise insoluble, Acker-
man stands on common ground with Robert Bork. He shares Bork's insis-
tence on the authoritarian character of the law-on the anteriority to the
case and exteriority to the judge of the arguments that determine judicial
action. Ackerman shares with Bork the view that judicial power cannot be
legitimate unless its exercise consists, in the final analysis, of the transla-
tion of directions uttered in the past by someone else-the people acting in
a suitably organized and galvanized jurisgenerative political modality.
As we know, actual episodes of such constitutional politics-of republi-
can popular mobilization-have been and probably must forever be rare
on the national scale. In effect, then, Ackerman seems to condemn the
history of the country's normative contention to the pattern once imposed
by Thomas Kuhn (on what I suppose may be called the vulgar reading of
Kuhn's view) on the history of science: we have extended periods of nor-
mal practice punctuated by occasional moments of revolutionary up-
rather construing the Bork nomination as a failed occasion of conservative constitutional transforma-
tion. See id. at 1178.
Against my pessimistic appraisal of Ackerman's theory's implications for the Bowers case, it might
be urged that the relevant values endorsed by American constitutional moments past are not limited to
the homophobic and moral-majoritarian values inspiring the majority and concurring opinions in that
case, but include also the libertarian, tolerationist, and anti-arbitrariness values inspiring the dissents.
I certainly agree that the tradition can actively be read to contain all of these values. See infra text
accompanying notes 175-80. The difficulty remains, however, that Ackerman has presented his con-
stitutional theory as specifically meant to dissuade judges from challenging currently prevailing consti-
tutional-legal common sense with intellectually strenuous readings of the constitutional past.
It seems that such dissuasion must be what Ackerman intends by his insistence on the extraordinary
and episodic character of "transformative" or "constitutional" politics, and on the need for finding
such an extraordinary constitutional-political event intervening between (say) Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 377 (1937), in order to justify the
decision in West Coast Hotel as properly judicial. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures, supra note 5,
at 1070. It seems no less true of the actual decision in West Coast Hotel than of a hypothetical
opposite decision in Bowers that (quite apart from any New Deal "structural amendment") the Amer-
ican constitutional past contained ample argumentative resources with which to justify that decision
and its reversal of Lochnerian conventional wisdom. See, e.g., Holmes, Liberal Guilt, in RESPONSI-
BILITY, RIGHTS AND WELFARE: THE THEORY OF THE WELFARE STATE (J. Moon ed. 1988);
Michelman, supra note 39. What is, however, also plainly true of both the constitutional arguments
favoring the Court's actual result in West Coast Hotel (pace structural amendment) and the argu-
ments favoring an opposite result in Bowers is that these arguments ran or would run strongly counter
to contemporarily regnant, conventional constitutional-legal wisdom. They were or are experienced as
hard arguments-elaborate, venturous, "fancy." It must be just such a perception of West Coast Hotel
that prompts Ackerman to say that, without help from structural amendment, any attempts to justify
the result in that case must be invitations to legal nihilism. But then it is quite unclear how this would
be any less true (assuming there is any truth in it) as applied to a hypothetical opposite result in
Bowers.
In order to dispel my inference about what his position implies regarding the correct judicial deci-
sion in Bowers, Ackerman would at the very least have to speak to the questions of (1) whether and
how a "re-collective" (or comparably strenuous) judicial approach to constitutional interpretation
might avoid or control the damage consisting of destruction of public confidence in the principle of
legality, and (2) how much, if any, risk of such damage is acceptable as the accompaniment of (other-
wise welcome) venturous constitutional adjudication. Perhaps Ackerman will in due course address
these questions successfully. Or perhaps it will turn out, when he does address them, that he has thus
far been too hasty in naming legal nihilism-rather than, say, legal authoritarianism, the equation of
legality with instruction-following-as the enemy his theory aims to slay.
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heaval."' Kuhn's normal science is Ackerman's popular-authoritarian
law; Kuhn's paradigm shift is Ackerman's "transformative" moment of
civically aroused popular politics.
The comparison suggests what is troubling about Ackerman's theory.
Kuhn's original statement came in for strong criticism on the ground of its
excessively authoritarian rendition of the proprieties of normal-scientific
practice, as too unquestioningly deferential to the regnant paradigms.
114
As Kuhn himself has acknowledged," 5 normal-scientific consensus is al-
ways in some degree spurious, and normal-scientific practice is always in
some degree nurturing the development of its own impending transforma-
tion. Science, on this more sensitive account, includes the work of what
might be called marginal or deviant practitioners aimed at undermining
rather than shoring up the currently dominant worldview. A shift from
pre- to posttransformation practice is more like a movement from margin
to center-a shift of attention-than it is like the total replacement of one
"world" by another." 6 Through the critique of Kuhn, we reach an appre-
ciation of scientific practice as cherishing all moments as potentially trans-
formative, so that it would be anti-scientific to exclude marginal or devia-
tionist investigators, as such, from the precincts of science.
Of course, where Kuhn's topic is the career-not to say the pro-
gress-of scientific understanding, Ackerman's is that of political freedom.
Whatever difference this makes seems unlikely to help Ackerman. It will
not be less strongly said of political freedom than of scientific understand-
ing that all moments are potentially transformative, so that the only way
to tell is to try.
To try is precisely to take leave of prior authority and of authoritarian
jurisprudence. If Michael Hardwick's case leaves the matter in doubt,
Linda Brown's should settle it. Although I suppose one could strain to
describe the series of judicial decisions from Brown 127 to Loving"' as re-
actively marking and consolidating the "final victory" of a constitutional
transformation already effectively wrought by the people," 9 that is not
113. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). Lipkin, supra
note 86, at 734-50, similarly insists on a sharp differentiation between "revolutionary" constitutional
adjudication, involving a reversal of some "foundational" constitutional-legal precept, and "normal,"
intra-paradigmatic constitutional adjudication, and on the impossibility of explaining or justifying rev-
olutionary adjudications-Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is the chief exam-
pie-without appeal to normative resources "extrinsic to the Constitution" such as a "critical-cul-
tural" or an "abstract" moral-political theory. For this essay's alternative account of Brown, see infra
text accompanying notes 117-22, 148-56.
114. See, e.g., Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF
KNOWLEDGE 197 (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970); Popper, Normal Science and its Dangers,
in id. at 51.
115. See T. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TFNSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION
AND USAGE (1977).
116. See, e.g., Feyerabend, supra note 114, at 207-10.
117. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
118. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
119. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1173.
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how we best describe these events. Surely the Court's role in them was
more prophetic-even if equivocal-than benedictory."2 °
The Court did not, of course, prophesy in a vacuum, but rather in a
context of changes in self-understanding pursued over the years by Black
Americans. 2 Black Americans, however, were not tantamount to "the
people," and there is no telling how long it would have taken for their
new foundations to have risen to the level of constitutional significance for
a Court following Ackerman's argument. Rather, they were, as of 1954,
still the marginalized and deviationist cultivators of transformative poten-
tial, a potential that both had been developed122 and would come to such
partial fruition as it has in part through the willing enlistment of the
Court. If we imagine the Brown Court acting in accordance with the un-
derstanding (to which Ackerman and I are both committed) of constitu-
tional adjudication as always proceeding from within an on-going norma-
tive dialogic practice, then that Court's willingness to be thus enlisted
must signify its grasp of the enlisters and their work as lying within the
bounds, if away from the center, of our then constitutional practice. Thus
informed, the Brown Court spoke in the accents of invention, not of con-
vention; it spoke for the future, criticizing the past; it spoke for law, creat-
ing authority; it engaged in political argument. In Hardwick's case the
Court did the opposite. It thus did, I have felt bound to suggest, what
Ackerman's theory apparently would have it do.123
IV. TOWARDS DIALOGIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Republican Process and Judicial Role
I launched this essay by suggesting two reasons for trying to refocus
constitutional vision on a republican notion of jurisgenerative politics as
the crux of political freedom: first, that such a notion would fortify consti-
tutional adjudicators against a liberty-deferring, authoritarian stance to-
wards constitutional law;"" and, second, that American constitutionalism
requires such a notion to redeem its problematic, dual promise of popular
120. For equivocation, see Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 (declining to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), thereby arguably sanitizing Plessy). Perhaps we should say that by this equivo-
cation the Brown opinion augured (as it by the same token recalled) an unfinished emancipation. See,
e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1332-33, 1333 n.3; Cornell, supra note 81, at 1176-70 (criticizing
Brown on this ground as insufficiently prophetic).
121. See, e.g., E. RUDWICK, W.E.B. DuBois: VoICE OF THE BLACK PROTEST MOVEMENT
(1982); BLACK LEADERS OF THE TwENm-rH CENTURY (J. Franklin & A. Meier eds. 1982); A.
MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA 1880-1915 (1963); see also infra notes 150-56 and accom-
panying text.
122. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938).
123. In his entertaining the possibility of "court-led ... transformation," there is indication that
Ackerman himself does not accept the attribution of such an implication to his theory. See supra note
111.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
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self-government and a government of laws.12 5 I then developed a certain
conception of jurisgenerative politics as an historically situated, recollective
process of normative contention; noticed the close resemblance between
that idealized account of politics and Dworkin's idealized account not of
politics but of adjudication; and contended that no appreciation of juris-
generative political possibility will drive out constitutional-legal authorita-
rianism without a further commitment to political jurisgenesis as a con-
stant, not an episodic, activity. 12 6 How, then, does my work-up of these
implications of republican constitutionalism not end by subverting the en-
tire practice of judicial review-implying its total subordination to popu-
lar politics-rather than by emboldening the independent spirit in which
that practice sometimes is carried on?
Certainly I have ventured far from the haven of Federalist No. 78.
Publius envisioned, and Ackerman still explains, the judiciary adjudicat-
ing constitutional cases as the vicariate of We The People, the founding
authority, during Our long vacations. If now we are to spread founding
moments over continuous political time, and if now we are to locate the
political virtue of a republicanly self-governing citizenry in its constant
cultivation of revisionary potential, then it seems that not only have we
lost the explanation for judicial review we thought we had, we have also
activated a heavy count against it: the Thayerite objection is now upon us
with a vengeance. 2
The work of John Ely points the way toward one line of response. If
republican constitutional possibility depends on the genesis of law in the
people's on-going normative contention, it follows that constitutional adju-
dicators serve that possibility by assisting in the maintenance of juris-
generative popular engagement. Republican constitutional jurisprudence
will to that extent be of the type that Laurence Tribe calls (and criticizes
as) "process-based,' '1 2' recalling Ely's well-known and controversial justi-
fication of judicial review as "representation reinforcing."
M 2 9
There will, however, remain a difference of substance between Ely's
process-based theory of judicial review and the one I have in mind, re-
flecting the difference between the conceptions of political possibility re-
spectively informing our two accounts-pluralist in Ely's case, republican
in mine.'3 Ely's theory would attack Georgia's morality-based justifica-
125. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 78-88, 101-23.
127. "[T]he tendency of a common and easy resort to [judicial review is] to dwarf the political
capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility" that comes from "fighting the
question out in the ordinary way." J. THAYER, supra note 103, at 106-07.
128. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063 (1980); see Michelman, supra note 5, at 42 n.223.
129. See J. ELY, supra note 63; Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353
(1981) (commending Ely's account); Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 239-57 (1981) (urging rejection of Ely's account).
130. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 63, at 77-84, 151-53 (presenting Ely's pluralism).
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tions for its discriminatory sodomy law on the ground that homosexuals as
a group are victimized by societal prejudice denying to their special inter-
ests a fair shake in the rounds of give-and-take comprising pluralist polit-
ics.131 That argument has nothing to say against outright rejection of its
pluralist premises by Justices disposed-on occasion-toward a republi-
can conception of law as an expression of public values springing from the
historically conditioned, normative persuasions of "the people."' 32 Such a
disposition always lurks in American constitutional sensibility; witness
Bowers v. Hardwick. Only a constitutional jurisprudence that takes it se-
riously can hope to provide effective defense against its popular-authorita-
rian excesses and perversions. But what, then, would a process-based, re-
publican-not-pluralist constitutional jurisprudence be like?
For the beginning of an answer, we must return finally to the challenge
of reclaiming the idea of jurisgenerative politics from its ancient context of
hierarchical, organicist, solidaristic communities for the modern context of
equality of respect, liberation from ascriptive social roles, and indissoluble
plurality of perspectives.1 3
B. Plurality: Public Vice to Public Virtue
Start again with the basal requirement for republican jurisgenerative
politics: that both the process and its law-like utterances must be such that
everyone subject to those utterances can regard himself or herself as actu-
ally agreeing that those utterances, issuing from that process, warrant be-
ing promulgated as law.'3 Given the modern supposition of pre-political
dissensus, it seems that no set of procedural conditions-no "ideal speech
situation"-can suffice to guarantee the requisite validation.3 5 Or rather,
to speak more carefully, this impossibility obtains as long as we suppose
that all of the participants' pre-political self-understandings and social
perspectives must axiomatically be regarded as completely impervious to
the persuasion of the process itself.1 8' Given plurality, a political process
can validate a societal norm as self-given law only if (i) participation in
the process results in some shift or adjustment in relevant understandings
on the parts of some (or all) participants, and (ii) there exists a set of
131. See id. at 162-64.
132. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 16-17 (1985):
Legislators may see homosexuals as "different" not out of [prejudice], but on... the basis of a
morality that treats certain sexual practices as repugnant to a particular view of humanity
.... Such legislation can be rejected only on the basis of... a [substantive] view of what it
means to be a person ....
133. See supra text accompanying note 32.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 69-71.
135. An "ideal speech situation" is a setting in which everyone, free of domination and false
consciousness, speaks out, listens, gives and is given reasons to and by everyone else. See, e.g., J.
HABERMAs, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 107-08 (T. McCarthy tr. 1975); T. MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL
THOUGHT OF JURGEN HABERMAS 305-07 (1978).
136. See S. BENHABIB, supra note 30, at 309-14.
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prescriptive social and procedural conditions such that one's undergoing,
under those conditions, such a dialogic modulation of one's understandings
is not considered or experienced as coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a
violation of one's identity or freedom, and (iii) those conditions actually
prevailed in the process supposed to be jurisgenerative 3 7
Of these three stipulations, the crucial and obviously problematic one is
stipulation (ii). To imagine that stipulation (ii) might be satisfied is not, I
want now to suggest, necessarily to imagine the possibility of dissolving to
the bottom rational (and passionate) disagreements attendant upon per-
spectival differences." 8" Perhaps such a final dissolution of difference is
not required in order to meet the validity condition that everyone subject
to a law-like utterance can actually agree that the utterance warrants be-
ing promulgated as law. In speaking of dialogic "modulation" of partici-
pants' pre-political understandings, I have meant to allow-as the Ameri-
can constitutional tradition evidently enjoins us to allow-for the
possibility of cases in which validation occurs when participants, rather
than "abandoning" their commitments, come to "hold the same commit-
ments in a new way."13"
If gaining a secure grasp on such a possibility stretches to the limits our
powers of comprehension, it may help to recall how we have come to be
making the attempt. I undertook in this essay to clarify certain conditions
of republican constitutionalism's possibility in a modern, liberal soci-
ety-to uncover certain beliefs we must hold regarding ourselves, our so-
cial relations, and specifically (as it turns out) our capacities for dialogic
self-modulation, as long as we profess commitment to both popular self-
government and a government of laws. Rather than claiming to establish
unconditionally that republican constitutionalism is possible for us, or that
we can coherently hold to both commitments, my strategy has been to
start with the actual, problematic experience of the dual commitments (I
trust that the experience is widely shared by readers) and from it derive a
normative idea of dialogic constitutionalism as consistent, at least, with
this problematic experience.1 4° That derivation is now essentially com-
137. See id. at 312-16.
138. See id. at 230 (accepting limitations on possibility of eliminating disagreements about
justice).
139. H. PITIN, supra note 31, at 279; see also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 119
(1943), discussed supra note 104. As an example of this possibility, consider Rawls' distinctions
among three grounds for commitment to a constitutional principle of freedom of conscience-(i) ad-
herence to a particular sect's tolerationist doctrine, (ii) adoption of a "comprehensive liberal moral
doctrine such as those of Kant and Mill," and (iii) belief that such a principle "expressels] political
values that, under the reasonably favorable conditions that make a more or less just constitutional
democracy possible, normally outweigh whatever other values may oppose [it]"-and his discussion of
the difference it makes which ground is operative. See Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 68,
at 9-15; see also H. Pitkin, supra note 31, at 102 (Machiavelli's equivocation between founders
suggests how individuals can experience shift in perspective on their traditions or values without being
disloyal to those traditions or values).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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plete, and its crucial result is stipulation (ii). But stipulation (ii), then,
does not occupy the status of an independent assertion, standing on its
own bottom so to speak, about actual or possible experience. Its status is
rather that of an inference about what we have to regard as possible as
long as we do not give up the historic American idea of constitutionalism.
What stipulation (ii) apparently describes is a process of personal self-
revision under social-dialogic stimulation. It contemplates, then, a self
whose identity and freedom consist, in part, in its capacity for reflexively
critical reconsideration of the ends and commitments that it already has
and that make it who it is.1 1 Such a self necessarily obtains its self-criti-
cal resources from, and tests its current understandings against, under-
standings from beyond its own pre-critical life and experience, which is to
say communicatively, by reaching for the perspectives of other and differ-
ent persons.1 42 If my argument to this point has held together, then these
dialogic conceptions of self and freedom are implications of the republi-
can-the American-ideal of political freedom in a modern liberal
state.143 Thus might a modern republican conception of political freedom
make a virtue of plurality.
1 44
C. The Dialogic Forum: Law and Politics, State, and Society
The legal form of plurality is indeterminacy-the susceptibility of the
received body of normative material to a plurality of interpretive distilla-
tions, pointing toward differing resolutions of pending cases and, through
141. See S. BENHABIB, supra note 30, at 332-33; M. SANDEL, supra note 82, at 179.
142. See S. BENHABM, supra note 30, at 333-34, 348-49.
143. Cf Cornell, supra note 81, at 1220-24 (explaining personal identity and freedom via law as
grounded in interpersonal "dialogic reciprocity").
144. See S. BENHABIB, supra note 30, at 348-49:
By "plurality" I . . . mean . . .that our embodied identity and the narrative history that
constitutes our selfhood give us each a perspective on the world, which can only be revealed in
a community of interaction with others. . . . A common, shared perspective is one that we
create insofar as in acting with others we discover our difference and identity, our distinctive-
ness from, and unity with, others. The emergence of such unity-in-difference comes through a
process of self-transformation and collective action....
Through such processes we learn to exercise political and moral judgment. We develop the
ability to see the world as it appears from perspectives different from ours. Such judgment is
not merely applying a given rule to a given content. In the first place it means learning to
recognize a given content and identifying it properly. This can only be achieved insofar as we
respect the dignity of the generalized other, who is our equal, by combining it with our aware-
ness of his or her concrete otherness. What we call content and context in human affairs is
constituted by the perspectives of those engaged in it.
At any point in time, we are one whose identity is constituted by a tale. This tale is never
complete: the past is always reformulated and renarrated in the light of the present and in
anticipation of a future. Yet this tale is not one of which we alone are the authors. Others...
often tell our stories for us and make us aware of their real meaning. . . . The interpretive
indeterminacy of action arises from the interpretive indeterminacy of a life-history.
Benhabib's notion of plurality is strongly reminiscent of the linked ideas of plurality and natality
derived by Hannah Arendt from her reflections on ancient republicanism, see, e.g., H. ARENDT,
supra note 31, at 8-9, although distinctly marked by Benhabib's emphasis on "concrete other-
ness"-our immediate experiences of encounter with the specific people who happen to belong to our
particular communities.
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them, toward differing normative futures."4 5 Legal indeterminacy in that
sense is the precondition of the dialogic, critical-transformative dimension
of our legal practice variously known as immanent critique, internal de-
velopment, deviationist doctrine, social criticism, and recollective
imagination. 4
But the generative indeterminacies are not just there as secrets awaiting
random discovery. Rather they are products of action, the creations of mo-
tivated acts of perception and cultivation.1, 7 Action by whom, then? Most
likely, it would seem, by those who enter the conversation-or, as we may
sometimes feel, seek to disrupt it-from its margins, rather than by those
presiding at the center. 48 So the suggestion is that the pursuit of political
freedom through law depends on "our" constant reach for inclusion of the
other, of the hitherto excluded-which in practice means bringing to
legal-doctrinal presence the hitherto absent voices of emergently self-con-
scious social groups. 4 9
Take for example the indeterminacy (as it became for a crucial moment
of time) of the American constitutional-legal principle of "equal protec-
tion of the laws" in its application to separate-but-equal public facilities
145. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 413; Cornell, supra note 81, at 196-98, 1201-04; cf. B.
FAY, supra note 69, at 169-73; id. at 168: "[T]he narrative of a person's life can never be settled
because the causal repercussions from it will continue indefinitely into the future, and because the
story which ought to be told about this life will be deeply affected by these repercussions."
146. See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 2, at 15-19; M. WALZER, INTERPRErATON AND SOCIAL
CRITICISM 20-22, 25 (1987); Cornell, supra note 81, at 1204-06.
147. See Cornell, supra note 81, at 1202-04.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16 (critique of Kuhn); B. HooKs, FEMINIST THE-
ORY: FROM MARGIN TO CFTER ix (1984):
To be in the margin is to be part of the whole but outside the main body.... Living as we
did-on the edge-we developed a particular way of seeing reality. We looked both from the
outside in and from the inside out.... This mode of seeing reminded us of the existence of a
whole universe, a main body made up of both margin and center. Our survival depended on an
ongoing public awareness of the separation between margin and center and on ongoing private
awareness that we were a necessary, vital part of that whole. This sense of wholeness ...
provided us an oppositional world view-a mode of seeing unknown to most of our oppressors,
that sustained us ... in our struggle to transform poverty and despair, strengthened our sense
of self and our solidarity.
Cf. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and the "Progress of the Law", 42 REc. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 960-61, 970
(1987):
How do we arrive at a new concept such as [the positive liberty of genuine opportunity, as
opposed to the negative liberty of absence of restraint]? Although we might get there by a
process of abstract philosophical reflection, most of us would initially take a different route.
The concept of positive liberty is easily arrived at by considering the plight of an employee
whose one "choice" is between working the hours the employer demands and not workirig at
all.... Only by remaining open to the entreaties of reason and passion, of logic and experi-
ence, can a judge come to understand the complex human meaning of a rich term such as
"liberty".... If due process values are to be preserved in the bureaucratic state of the late
Twentieth Century, it may be essential that officials possess passion-the passion that puts
them in touch with the dreams and disappointments of those with whom they deal.
149. See Minow, supra note 10, at 1867 ("cognizance of rights . . . is ... knowledge of the
process by which hurts that once were whispered or unheard have become claims, and claims that
once were unsuccessful have persuaded others and transformed social life"); see also Hartog, The
Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All", 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013,
1014-17, 1024 (1987).
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or formally neutral interracial sex and marriage laws.1"' That indetermi-
nacy arose along with the rise in American legal culture of belief (always
contested) in such factors as the social construction of race, the subordina-
tive motivations and meanings built into that construction, the efficacy of
subordinative cultural meaning as race-specific harming, and the injustice
of a legal order (including legal doctrines of formal equality) sustaining
and reproducing the constructions and meanings that wreak such
harms.
15 '
How does such a new slant on the world penetrate the dominant con-
sciousness? Without belaboring the point, does anyone doubt the primary
and crucial role in this instance of the emergent social presence and self-
emancipatory activity of Black Americans? 52 Does anyone doubt that
their impact on the rest of us has reflected their own oppositional under-
standings of their situation and its relation to our (and increasingly their)
Constitution153 -developed, in part, through conflict within their own
community, 54 in a process that both challenged and utilized such partial
citizenship as the Constitution granted and allowed them 55 (and left its
clear imprint on constitutional law both within and beyond the topical
area of race 156)? Does anyone doubt that the judicial agents of the chal-
lengers' accumulating citizenship drew on interpretive possibilities that
the challengers' own activity was helping to create?
150. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950). Perhaps the best memorial of the moment of indeterminacy is Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
151. See, e.g., 1 G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944); Colker, Anti-Subordination
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimi-
nation Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of the Supreme Court's Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). But see Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of
the Constitution-The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J.
691 (1987) (recognizing but deploring influence of such matters of "sensitivity" (as opposed to "jus-
tice") on recent directions in constitutional-legal treatment of race).
152. See, e.g., R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); G. McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES
HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983); J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE
PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 1954-65 (1987); Davis, In Commemoration of the Bicenten-
nial Celebration: Blacks and the Constitution, 30 How. L.J. 915 (1987).
153. See Lawrence, Promises to Keep: We are the Constitution's Framers, 30 How. L.J. 645
(1987).
154. See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970) (involving
conflict between cause of desegregation and concern for educational effectiveness and minority control
in community schools); D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 424-31 (2d ed. 1980) (re-
counting arguments in this conflict and citing authorities).
155. See Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1364-65 ("Blacks' assertion of their rights constituted a
serious ideological challenge to white supremacy.... In asserting rights, Blacks defied a system which
had long determined that Blacks were not and should not have been included."); see also id. at
1381-82.
156. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 455 (1958); Burn-
ham, Reflections on the Civil Rights Movement and the First Amendment, in A LESS THAN PER-
FECT UNION 335 (J. Lobel ed. 1988); cf. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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The full lesson of the civil rights movement will escape whoever focuses
too sharply on the country's most visible, formal legislative assem-
blies-Congress, state legislatures, the councils of major cities-as exclu-
sive, or even primary, arenas of jurisgenerative politics and political free-
dom. I do not mean that those arenas are dispensable or unimportant.
Rather I mean the obvious points that much of the country's normatively
consequential dialogue occurs outside the major, formal channels of electo-
ral and legislative politics, and that in modern society those formal chan-
nels cannot possibly provide for most citizens much direct experience of
self-revisionary, dialogic engagement. Much, perhaps most, of that experi-
ence must occur in various arenas of what we know as public life in the
broad sense, some nominally political and some not: in the encounters and
conflicts, interactions and debates that arise in and around town meetings
and local government agencies; civic and voluntary organizations; social
and recreational clubs; schools public and private; managements, director-
ates and leadership groups of organizations of all kinds; workplaces and
shop floors; public events and street life; and so on. Those are all arenas
of potentially transformative dialogue. 157 Understandings of the social
world that are contested and shaped in the daily encounters and transac-
tions of civil society at large are of course conveyed to our representative
arenas. They also, obviously, enter into determinations of policy that occur
within nominally private settings but that can affect people's lives no less
profoundly than government action. Those encounters and transactions
are, then, to be counted among the sources and channels of republican
self-government and jurisgenerative politics. They are arenas of citizen-
ship in the comparably broad sense in which citizenship encompasses not
just formal participation in affairs of state but respected and self-respect-
ing presence-distinct and audible voice-in public and social life at
large.
Such a non-state centered notion of republican citizenship is, of course,
both historically American15 and congenial to a characteristic strain in
contemporary civic revivalism. 159 My argument in this essay leads to it by
way of two distinct but related considerations. One is that a notion of
republican dialogue not exclusively and immediately tied to the coercive
exercise of centralized majoritarian power can help make credible for con-
temporary Americans the idea of social and procedural conditions'"0
157. See Minow, supra note 10, at 1861-62. In what follows I continue in the spirit of Bruce
Ackerman's urging of an anti-formalist understanding of constitutional "conventions," only carrying it
further. See supra text accompanying notes 105-109. I also offer some vindication for Laurence
Tribe's superficially implausible assertion that we are all constantly engaged in "constitutional
choices." See L. TRIBE, supra note 132, at vii.
158. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (G. Lawrence trans. 1969).
159. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 5.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44 ("Stipulation (ii)").
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under which communicative revision of a citizen's normative understand-
ings escapes condemnation as oppression.""'
The other is that by noticing how some of the well-springs of republi-
can politics are separated from the ultimate political process-by locating
them in extra-governmental social processes that state law, therefore, may
either nurture or suppress-we obtain a non-Publian but still republican
rejoinder to the Thayerite objection to judicial review. The Court helps
protect the republican state-that is, the citizens politically en-
gaged-from lapsing into a politics of self-denial. It challenges "the peo-
ple's" self-enclosing tendency to assume their own moral completion as
they now are and thus to deny to themselves the plurality on which their
capacity for transformative self-renewal depends.
16 2
V. CONCLUSION: LAW'S REPUBLIC
All the components of the republican constitutional argument for an
opposite result in Bowers v. Hardwick are now before us. The argument
construes Hardwick's complaint as, in essence, one of unjustified denial of
due citizenship (or is it due foundership?) by reason of denial of liberty,
and specifically of that aspect of liberty we have come to know as privacy;
its text is section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The argument ac-
161. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 29, at 11-19, 40-44 (comparing "jurisgenerative" local and
voluntary communities with "jurispathic" central, court-administered law); Cover, Violence and the
Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1628 (1986) (warning against "exaggerating the extent to which any
interpretation rendered as part of a state act of violence can ever constitute a common and coherent
meaning"). Consider American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding anti-pornography ordinance violative of First Amendment), affd per curiam, 475 U.S. 1001
(1986), where Circuit Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit panel, accepted the city's
argument that pornography, like other communication, can affect its readers' attitudes and behaviors
in ways that are harmful to others, but reasoned from this premise to an anti-censorship conclusion:
"Change in any complex system ultimately depends on the ability of outsiders to challenge accepted
views and the reigning institutions. Without a strong guarantee of freedom of speech, there is no
effective right to challenge what is." See Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the
First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1982). Judge Easterbrook unfortunately offered only an
authoritarian response (see Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 325, 327) to the argument that in some circum-
stances too strong-too absolute-a free-speech guarantee can itself result in denial of an effective
right to challenge what is. See C. MAcKINNON, Frances Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights,
and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW 163, 192-95 (1987); Fiss,
Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987); Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment,
1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 618-24.
162. "The Constitution demands the full measure of all our human capacities, not merely from
judges, nor from rulers, but from our ultimate sovereign-the people." Brennan, supra note 148, at
975.
To allay any possible misunderstanding, I do not mean to be offering here a complete or exhaustive
theory of judicial review, in which counter-action against popular self-enclosure is all there is for the
Court to do-anymore than even Ely can plausibly claim that "representation-reinforcement" ex-
hausts the meaning of the Constitution. See J. ELY, supra note 63, at 88-101; Brennan, supra note
28, at 437.
163. It reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
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cepts without question Georgia's explanation of the meaning and purpose
of its challenged law: the meaning is to brand and punish as criminal the
engagement by homosexual partners, but not heterosexual partners, in
certain forms of sexual intimacy, and the purpose is to give expression and
effect to a legislative majority's moral rejection of homosexual life.
Such a purpose is deeply suspect under the modern republican commit-
ment to social plurality. In the circumstances of contemporary society, ho-
mosexuality has come to signify not just a certain sort of inclination that
"anyone" might feel, but a more personally constitutive and distinctive
way, or ways, of being."' Homosexuality has come to be experienced,
claimed, socially reflected and-if ambiguously-confirmed as an aspect
of identity demanding respect.16 5 What is more, by its very emergence as
an aspect of ways of living and not just an inclination or taste, homosexu-
ality challenges established orders.166
It seems very likely that among the effects of a law like Georgia's on
persons for whom homosexuality is an aspect of identity is denial or im-
pairment of their citizenship, in the broad sense which I have suggested is
appropriate to modern republican constitutionalism: that of admission to
full and effective participation in the various arenas of public life.167 It
has this effect, in the first place, as a public expression endorsing and
reinforcing majoritarian denigration and suppression of homosexual iden-
tity.168 It also-and for my purposes more interestingly-denies citizen-
ship by violating privacy.
The Bork nomination hearings have made clear that "privacy" (in a
sense directly implicated by Hardwick's claim) enjoys broad popular sup-
port as a constitutional value. Yet the notion remains suspect, for differing
reasons, among constitutional commentators of widely differing persua-
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citi-
zenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1977).
164. See Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 1, 15,
24-26; Richards, supra note 2, at 854; Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Ho-
mosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1304-05 (1985).
165. See Law, supra note 164, at 20-31.
166. Sylvia Law writes:
Lesbians and gay men pose a formidable threat to the classic gender script. They deny the
inevitability of heterosexuality....
[W]hen homosexual people build relationships of caring and commitment, they deny tradi-
tional belief and prescription that stable relations require the reciprocity of male/female polar-
ity. In homosexual relationships, authority and hierarchy cannot be premised on the traditional
criteria of gender. For this reason lesbian and gay couples who create stable loving relation-
ships are indeed more threatening to conservative values than mere isolated violators of the ban
on non-marital sex.
Id. at 24, 31-32; see also Note, supra note 164, at 1307.
167. Cf Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. Rv. 303
(1986) (developing similar conception of constitutional citizenship rights for members of ethnocul-
turally identifiable groups).
168. See Law, supra note 164, at 4, 6-8; cf. Lawrence, supra note 151 (explaining injurious
impacts of laws' "cultural meanings" in racial contexts).
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sions. Conservative originalists of course condemn it as illegitimate judicial
invention. What is more striking is that some strong supporters of
women's rights of choice in regard to child-bearing have cogently criti-
cized the Supreme Court's decisions169 affirming such rights for basing
them on a constitutional principle of privacy."' The core of the criticism
is that the privacy rationale conceptually separates this aspect (and by
implication others) of the problem of women's subordination from the do-
main of public or political concern. The privacy rationale, it is argued,
implies that the choice, or the problem, is, precisely, the individual wo-
man's own concern-an implication that has untoward political and doc-
trinal ramifications, one of which is the unconditional release of the state
(that is, the political public at large) from any responsibility for assuring
or supplying resources needed by poor women to make practically effec-
tive their putative choices for abortion.'
In somewhat similar fashion it has been argued that a constitutional
privacy principle would be a poor basis on which to ground judicial inval-
idation of laws, such as Georgia's, penalizing homosexual sex. To base
such a decision on privacy, it is said, would be to reinforce the idea "that
homosexuality is merely a form of [bedroom] conduct ...rather than a
continuous aspect of identity" demanding public expression; it would be to
fail to recognize that "'freedom to have impact on others-to make the
"statement" implicit in a public identity-is central to any adequate con-
ception of the self.'" Such a decision would do little to allay "pervasive
discrimination against gays" in public society; it would not itself contrib-
ute, nor would it directly empower its beneficiaries to contribute, to
"heightening public awareness of homosexuality and thus broadening
public acceptance of gay lifestyles." To the contrary, it would burden ho-
mosexuality with the stigma of the quarantine."'
These critiques of constitutional privacy doctrine reveal the dangers of
reliance on such a doctrine as long as privacy stands for an attitude of
hostility towards public life and a need for refuge from and protection
against public power. This way of valorizing a legally protected, private
realm, as the counter to a state regarded solely as a dangerous instrumen-
tality whose tendencies to overreach must be curbed even at some signifi-
cant cost in policy goals foregone, has been salient in American constitu-
tional thought. By contrast to this oft-used strategy of carving a private
space to defend against the public, a republican slant on the same issues
169. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972).
170. See MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in C. MAcKINNON, supra note
161, at 93; cf. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties,
and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 338 (1985) (suggesting that Court's
description of its holding as based on privacy inadequately conveys true ground of decision).
171. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
172. See Note, supra note 164, at 1290-91 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 15-1, at 888 (1st ed. 1978)).
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produces a reoriented understanding: not only an appreciation of the ac-
tive state's potential as an affirmative friend to effective liberty as political
freedom,' 7 ' but an appreciation of privacy as a political right.
Just as property rights-rights of having and holding material re-
sources-become, in a republican perspective, a matter of constitutive po-
litical concern as underpinning the independence and authenticity of the
citizen's contribution to the collective determinations of public life,"'4 so is
it with the privacies of personal refuge and intimacy."' Justice Black-
mun's dissenting opinion in Bowers at least begins to articulate this re-
publican appreciation of the political significance of privacy, both by itself
explaining the value of intimate association as formative and supportive of
personal identity, of self-understanding, and thus of diverse ways of
life,"' and by its reference" 7' to the Court's earlier rumination, in Roberts
v. United States Jaycees,'78 on the "central[ity] to our constitutional
scheme" of a protected sphere of intimate association."' 9 This cross-fertili-
zation of the constitutional-legal notion of autonomy-simple personal lib-
erty-by the first-amendment inspired value of freedom of association'"0
nicely represents the republican penchant for rights that bridge the per-
sonal and the political.
The argument also nicely illustrates the re-collective aspect of constitu-
tional-legal interpretation. The argument realigns our accustomed sense of
the relation between privacy and political freedom by regarding privacy
not only as an end (however controversial) of liberation by law but also as
such liberation's constant and regenerative-jurisgenerative-beginning.
The argument forges the link between privacy and citizenship. It attacks
the Georgia law for denying or impairing citizenship by exposing to the
173. Such appreciations are manifest in Fiss, supra note 161, and Tribe, supra note 170, al-
though not linked by either author to republican credentials.
174. See, e.g., Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution, supra note 39, at 1329.
175. See supra notes 43 & 142 and accompanying texts. Such an understanding of the political
significance of privacy seems to have been deep in ancient, classical republicanism, although institu-
tionalized in a way repellant to us: that is, in the idea of the oikos, the dominated household to which
the independent citizen retired for service (by noncitizens) to his bodily needs for sustenance and
release, and his spiritual need for replenishment (by the daily experience of his domestic mastership)
of his sense of independent self-direction. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 29-30 n.138.
176. See supra note 38.
177. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
179. Justice Blackmun explains:
[W]e have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture
and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the
State.
Id. at 618-19; see also Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 772-73 (1973).
180. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (granting constitutional protec-
tion to "freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas [as] an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment," against regulation
that would "affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its members to pursue their collective
effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate").
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hazards of criminal prosecution the intimate associations through which
personal moral understandings and identities are formed and sustained.1""
Doubtless an argument along these lines involves a degree of reinter-
pretation, or reorientation, of constitutional history. It involves, for exam-
ple, a definitive decoupling of rights of "privacy" and "intimate associa-
tion" from a certain "traditional" cult of the family. The argument re-
collects the authorities and recasts the tradition along the axes of self-
formation and diversity rather than those of dominant social expectation
and conformity.
Such a re-collective form of argument is, of course, not in the least
foreign to ordinary American constitutional-legal practice; the example I
have just presented is, after all, drawn in part from Justice Blackmun's
Bowers dissent. Thus, in appropriating for "republican" constitutional
theory Cornell's idealization of that practice as the exercise of "recollective
imagination," I do not mean to be describing or prescribing a novel set of
legal-doctrinal operations, by which lawyers and judges would refer to
different kinds of sources, or say different kinds of things about them,
than they now do. What is rather at issue is one's comprehension of the
"point" of the practice 82--one's sense of an underlying "best theory of
law" 1s-that gives shape and orientation to these familiar operations.
My work-up of the republican case for Hardwick's right thus exhibits
the disputatious activity of constitutional interpretation as a Machiavellian
practice of return-to-the-founding-principles in which the first principle of
the founding-the "point" of the practice-turns out to be just that of the
constant value of (re)foundation (renewal, renovation) itself. In the larger
frame of history, the ascription of such a "point" to American constitu-
tionalism can hardly be called non-interpretive. I have presented the argu-
ment as motivated by a republican commitment to social plurality, but the
larger contention of this essay has been that the same commitment is im-
plicit in American constitutionalism's most basic professions of attachment
to both self-government and a government of laws. In that sense, I claim,
republican inspiration enters the privacy-based argument for a reversal of
Bowers along with the deepest, organizing premises of American constitu-
tional discourse. Precisely because it is a problem, not a solution, that
those premises construct-and because, further, it is the problematic char-
acter of that central constitutional construct that allows the Constitution to
ground our identity as a political community by also inviting us to self-
181. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 99 YALE L.J. 624, 635-37 (1980); Law,
supra note 164, at 38-40; Richards, supra note 2, at 843-45, 852-53, 855-56. For a defense of a
decisional-privacy rationale for permissive abortion rights resting on a contractarian argument that
starts with the idea of such privacy as a pre-political moral right of any individual-an aspect of the
individual's right to equal respect and concern-but also adverts to the instrumental relation between
privacy and citizenship, see Allen, supra note 70, at 462, 473 & passim.
182. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 58-59, 87-88.
183. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106-07 (1977).
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revision through debate over its meaning-there is no demonstrating that
the republican-inspired, process-based, reverse-Bowers argument I have
presented is what the Fourteenth Amendment has always meant or al-
ways will mean, or is all and only what it means today."" All that I, or
anyone, can offer is an argument, not a demonstration, about the Consti-
tution's meaning in this context, now, as both ours and law.
The difficulty remains of explaining how it can be right to address such
a non-demonstrative argument about the impermanent meaning of the
people's law to any body other than the People. Judges perhaps enjoy a
situational advantage over the people at large in listening for voices from
the margins.185 Judges are perhaps better situated to conduct a sympa-
thetic inquiry into how, if at all, the readings of history upon which those
voices base their complaint can count as interpretations of that his-
tory-interpretations which, however re-collective or even transformative,
remain true to that history's informing commitment to the pursuit of po-
litical freedom through jurisgenerative politics. Still, a judicial constitu-
tional convention is not equivalent-indeed, it is contrary-to actual de-
mocracy. That difficulty, too, must yield (if at all) to a pragmatic
consideration: Actual democracy is not all there is to political freedom,
and Hardwick is before us, appealing to law's republic.
184. See Hartog, supra note 149, at 1032.
185. See Minow, supra note 50, at 74-95; Minow, supra note 10, at 1880-81:
The interpretive approach construes a claim of right, made before a judge, as a plea for recog-
nition of membership in a community shared by applicant and judge.... The use of rights
discourse affirms ... a community that acknowledges and admits historic uses of powers to
exclude, deny, and silence-and commits itself to enabling suppressed points of view to be
heard, to make covert conflict overt.
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